Directions and Prospects for Introducing Judicial Oversight over Operative-Search Activities

Abstract

Operational-search activity (OSA) plays an integral role in criminal proceedings by providing covert investigative tools necessary for combating complex, organized, and cyber crimes. In Uzbekistan, legislative ambiguities persist regarding the procedural status of OSA, with inconsistencies between the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and OSA regulations limiting the integration of operational intelligence into admissible evidence. Despite the growing reliance on OSA to address rising crime rates, there remains an absence of clear legal frameworks ensuring judicial oversight and procedural transparency when transforming OSA results into evidence. This study aims to analyze the doctrinal, legislative, and practical challenges of introducing judicial oversight over operational-search activities, proposing mechanisms for integrating OSA into criminal procedure while preserving constitutional rights. The analysis reveals that the lack of statutory mechanisms for using OSA data reduces its evidentiary potential, undermines procedural safeguards, and creates disparities in investigative functions. The paper argues for disqualification rules preventing dual procedural roles, clearer regulatory frameworks for admissibility, and judicial oversight by district courts to enhance accountability and legality. The study highlights the introduction of investigating judges in Uzbekistan as an institutional innovation to strengthen judicial oversight over OSA, proposing principles for regulating non-transparent investigative actions without compromising efficiency. Integrating OSA under judicial control would improve crime detection, expand evidentiary bases, strengthen procedural transparency, and ensure that operational activities comply with constitutional protections, contributing to a more effective and rights-based criminal justice system.