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### Georgia and European Political Processes in the Second Half of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century

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#### Abstract:

The Seven Years' War played a crucial role in defining the world-historical process of the 60-ies of the XVIII century and later period. It radically changed the European diplomatic configuration of that time and replaced French dominance with English.

An analysis of the documentary sources and secret treaty concluded between the states reveals that the main ideological architect of the unusual end of the Seven Years' War, in particular, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Berlin, was King Friedrich II of Prussia. It was the idea of Friedrich II to change the vector of Russian foreign policy. As a result, the idea of neutralizing the Ottoman Empire's southern direction turned out to be preferential for the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg compared with the previous northern vector.

The article shows that these processes are caused by the Russian-Austrian "Greek Project", the concept of European redistribution, which takes its final shape in 1782. These conceptual problems are connected absolutely to all problems existing in the Caucasus, including the ones related to the foreign strategy or internal political processes of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti.

On the one hand, the contradictions created by the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg against Erekle II in regard of formation a Unified Caucasus State and the solution of other conceptual issues, fulfilled through intrigues, coups d'etat, planning the assassination of kings and the assassinations of European ambassadors, the systemic problems posed by the Ottoman Empire to the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and on the other hand, the consequences of the Greek Project implementation could bring to Georgia, the Caucasus region as a whole, to Europe and Russia, are reviewed in the current article.

The organic union of these topics unequivocally confirms that the key to solving all problems of Georgia of the 50-90-ies of the XVIII century was related to the concept of European redistribution, the Greek Project, one of the main political products of the Seven Years' War.

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## INTRODUCTION

The Seven Years' War had the greatest impact on the world-historical process. The influence of the latter on the political events of the following period was rather great. The ongoing battles in Europe turned the world political configuration of the XVIII century upside down. Herein, it was a war of unprecedented scale participated by all great states of the world. Winston Churchill unequivocally points out that the Seven Years' War contained all the signs to call it World War I.

The Seven Years' War and the most important conceptual process associated with it have been completely ignored by both Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet Georgian historiography during the study of Georgian history of 50-90-ies of the XVIII century. Unfortunately, the reason is the Soviet ideology that could not be overcome by modern Georgian historiography. Due to this, the most important conceptual issue - the Seven Years' War and Georgia – has not been studied either through the level of a monograph or the level of a single scientific article.

The current study is a part of a scientific monograph clearly presenting the organic conceptual relations between the Seven Years' War, the coup d'etat of Russia in 1762 and the socio-political processes taking place in the Caucasus.

### Purpose of the Study

The aim of the current study is to show the interrelationship and consistency existing between the world-historical processes developed as a result of the Seven Years' War and the events developed in the Caucasus and Georgia during the 50-90-ies of the XVIII century; to connect the processes developed during the Seven Years' War with the Russian-Austrian project of European redistribution; to present the connection of the events in the Caucasus and Georgia with the existing world historical processes determined by the Greek Project and the Seven Years' War.

### Novelty of the Study

The issue of the interrelationship between the Seven Years' War and Georgia has been studied neither at the level of a monograph, nor a single scientific article. Therefore, the current study is the first attempt in historiography to review and analyze the political processes ongoing in the Caucasus and Georgia during the 50-90-ies of the XVIII century within the context of the Seven Years' War.

It is proved and recognized that Georgia and the Caucasus have been the target of almost all world empires throughout the history of the world. Taking into consideration the latter, it seems rather strange that the most important event of the XVIII century - the Seven Years' War was deliberately ignored by Soviet, Russian and modern Georgian historiography.

This is a classic example of the Soviet conjuncture, clearly indicating that the Caucasus is not a part of world civilization, but a geostrategic segment moving around the Russian orbit. Discussing the issue from such a viewpoint does not answer several key questions proving that the problem should be considered through a different methodology, within the historical context of the world.

It is with this methodology that we study the Greek project. Excerpts from our research have been published in various scientific publications in Oxford [51; 67; 68], Cambridge [55; 59; 62], Paris

[58; 63]; Washington [66]; Melbourne [57], Moscow [54], Tokyo [56], Rome [50], Vienna [49], Warsaw [42; 43], Boston [41], San Francisco [45], Sheffield [44], Las Palmas [48], Porto [65] Tbilisi [46; 60; 64], Telavi [47; 52] Kutaisi [53; 61].

It is undisputed that the process of world history has been properly reflected on the Caucasus at all times. Russian and Soviet historiography do not use it in regard to the Seven Years' War for some reasons. However, it is the most important event that actually turned the geostrategic policy of the world states upside down and was recognized by Churchill as the First World War, when the world was actually shifted to other rails.

### **Research methods**

We rely on the methodological principles of objectivity, historicism, determinism, alternativeness, and reconstruction, developed in the theoretical studies by the following scientists: Charles-Victor Langlois, Charles Seignobos[31]; Robin George Collingwood [8]; Marc Léopold Benjamin Bloch [6]; Peter Lambert and Phillip Schofield [32]; Abrams Lynn [1]; Brundage Anthony [5]; Gregory Ian, Ell Paul [15]; Hughes-Warrington [22]; Iggers George, Wang Qiang Edward [24]; Akira Iriye [25]; Kaldellis Anthony [27]; Koselleck Reinhart [29;28]; Lukacs John [30]; Munro Doug, Reid John [40]; Quigley Carroll [71]; Raaflaub Kurt [73].

### **Sources**

There are important primary sources for the research of The Seven Years' War and Caucasian Outlines of the Greek Project: The international treaties of Russia-Austria and Russia-Prussia, published by Martens [35;36] and the correspondence of Joseph II, the Emperor of Austria and Catherine II, the Empress of Russia [2, p. 143-157; 33, p 281-291; 80, p 1-4]; Records of Lord Harris, Ambassador of England On the reign of Catherine II [18;19;20;21]; The political correspondence of Frederick II [12; 14; 13]; The correspondence of Catherine and of Frederick II [12]; Documentary materials about the Seven Years' War[11; 79]; Project for the annexation of East Prussia to the Russian Empire[4].

Italian translation of Erekle II's letters, addressed to the European Monarchs of his time, preserved in the archives of several European countries, is the most important source to study the issue. The most important part of this source is preserved in the State Archive of Austria (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, 1010 Wien, I, Minoritenplatz I). Two letters were published by Mikheil Tamarashvili [80, p 402-404; 81], afterward invaluable epistolary material was found in the archives of the Vatican, Vienna, and Venice by Ilia Tabaghua, who attached these documents to a monograph published in 1979 [82]. In order to clarify the referred problem, the state official or unofficial documents of the respective period, collected and published in three volumes by Alexander Tsagareli in 1891-1902 are of inestimable importance [84; 85; 86].

### **Research Results**

The Seven Years' War of 1756-1763, referred as World War I by Winston Churchill mar, made a fundamental change in world history. Not only the large-scale political conflicts of the XVIII century but also the most important conceptual problems of modern history were solved by this war [34, p. 17-18].

The outcomes of the war gave way to qualitatively new global processes, a new political

configuration of the world. The Seven Years' War put an end to the pre-existing French dominance and replaced it with a British one that continues until the present moment [76, p. 46-57].

That is why the Seven Years' War is of paramount importance for the cognition of the modern world historical process. England won this war. At that time England, as a state, still did not have a model of liberal governance, nor the economy built on liberal principles. Nevertheless, it had a representative body of state governance, as well as the outlined principles and features of modern capitalism.

The victory of the Seven Years' War gives way to the beginning of a new era in the world politics that remains dominant until the present moment in the form of English-speaking liberal-democratic governance. The Seven Years' War ensures the formation of the world political landscape that has survived until now. The world order was based on the governance methods of English-speaking countries. The attempts to disrupt the referred order, through World War I and World War II, were rather unsuccessful. The purpose of the Cold War was the same as well [34, p. 23-26].

During the Seven Years' War, the Russian army achieved particular success. Its target was East Prussia, otherwise known as Brandenburg Prussia, it is a special territory for the Kingdom of Prussia - the homeland of Friedrich II and therefore the royal estate.

The Russian Army occupied East Prussia in 1758. The Imperial Court of St. Petersburg also understood that occupying the territory does not mean the disposition as well. A number of measures should be taken for it. One of the measures is to make the population of East Prussia swear to the allegiance of the Empress of Russia. The Empress of Russia appoints her own governors in Königsberg only after that procedure. In addition, due to the great importance of this event, Prussian coins with the image of Elizaveta Petrovna are also made [75, p. 56-71].

It is rather a characteristic detail, as the coin is used not only in East Prussia. Hence, a real underlying reason is perceived making clear all purposes of the Russian aggression - its target Prussia is not entirely limited to the East.

These conquests are a continuation of the campaign launched by Peter I, it was Peter who swore the people of Estland and Lifland to allegiance to the Russian Royal Throne until Sweden formally renounced these territories at the Congress of Nystad in 1721.

The situation changes radically after the death of Elizaveta Petrovna and the enthronement of Peter III at the Imperial Court of Russia. The Russian army leaves not only East Prussia but also the most important strategic point in Berlin by the initiative of Peter III. Hence, completely different goals and prospects appear for Russian aggression.

Attempts to ease Russia's aggressive policy date back to pre-revolutionary historiography. Bezobrazov, a Russian scholar, explains this phenomenon by the pressure of the Imperial Court of Versailles on St. Petersburg and concludes that the reason for such a change of events contains certain factors - the death of Elizaveta Petrovna and the radically different moods of Peter III. It was preconditioned by the international demand and Versailles expressed the interests of Europe. Consequently, after these events, Russia abandoned the territory of Europe [7, p.255].

The preferred version is repeated by the modern Russian researcher Cherkasov [9, p. 294]. Cherkasov, like Besobrasov, links the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Europe to the demand of Versailles.

Chinyakov, the contemporary Russian scientist, has an even different opinion claiming that if Elizaveta Petrovna had lived before the end of the Seven Years' War, the end result would have been exactly the same as it was in the time of Peter III [10, p.87].

Undoubtedly, the most important factor is the Imperial Court of Versailles and its influence on Europe at that time. Therefore, the desire of the French is clear - not to allow the emergence of a new political force in Europe, especially in a politically growing and aggression-oriented state of Russia. But one is the desire of the French and the other is the political goals of the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg. Withdrawal from Berlin means complete capitulation and such capitulation is an unprecedented event in Russian military history, so we categorically rule out such action by the Russian army at the behest of another state.

First of all, no document is available proving that Versailles categorically demands from Imperial Court of the St. Petersburg to leave Berlin. Secondly, even if such a document exists, no precedent can be found in Russian military history when it obediently and without resistance fulfills such an ultimatum to satisfy the wills and desires of others. Therefore, we think the unprecedented, extraordinary change of events during the Seven Years' War, Russia's withdrawal from Berlin and its refusal to conquer Europe are the unanswered questions in the current historiography. It is really peculiar – in fact Russia has obtained a mantle of triumph - it is in the middle of Europe its troops are disposed in Berlin. Ensuring to gain influence on Europe.

Within the given situation, where everything is guaranteed and favorable he gives up the advantage, the prospect of further attack on Europe and thinks about changing the vector of foreign policy. Thinks of attacking in the direction, though nothing is guaranteed. It chooses to conquer Turkey instead of conquering Europe. However, this is the most difficult task, tried by the European states for a long time - Ottoman Empire is stretched across three continents and claims world domination. Evidently, the decision of the Russian emperor to leave Berlin is a very illogical and impractical move.

A number of questions arise – why Russia misses an already guaranteed opportunity and consider fighting with the World Empire stretched over three continents more successful than fighting with fragmented Europe unable to have communications based on the internal confrontation?

Obviously, Russia has a rather real chance of military success in Western Europe. It has several reasons:

1. Europe has a more adapted and familiar environment for Russian soldiers.
2. Prussia has not reached the desired condition yet, so its revanchist sentiments are unlikely to work.
3. Using the confrontation existing between Prussia and Austria gives an additional bonus to the Imperial Court of Russia ... Austria is an ally of Russia and Maria Theresa has a political confrontation with Friedrich. Consequently, a confrontation between Austria with Russia is less possible.
4. Confrontation of France with Prussia shall be taken into consideration as well.

Therefore, the change in Russia's foreign vector leaves even more questions within the context of the referred four factors. Obviously, a rather competent and influential force works against the logical decisions. Political sub-flows are present as well.

The most reliable criterion to make objective conclusions is to define who benefited from the change of Russia's foreign political vector - Russia itself or someone else?

The answer is unequivocal - the change of the foreign policy vector for Russia was just a series of new problems, it was actually a recommencement of already started and successful work, but with less chance of success, unlike the previous one.

The only winners of this project were Prussia and Friedrich II. He was the most fortunate, as far as the development of events should be followed by the destruction of Prussia as a state. The sudden decision of the Russian Emperor Peter III worked in the absolutely opposite direction.

Obviously, Friedrich II understands that everything was determined by a certain factor. Peter III is German, he loves his homeland extremely and he also has certain sympathy towards Friedrich. This turned out to be favorable for Friedrich II in a specific situation [74, p. 37-49].

However, the personal factor is favorable only for a single time. Friedrich II is well aware of it and hence the idea rises to formulate the referred personal sentiments as a systemic model.

However, this is a rather difficult task. Friedrich needs scrupulous political and geostrategic calculations - the main thesis of this concept is that the details of the referred systemic model should be acceptable to any European state, moreover - this systemic model should reflect the moods and political aspirations of the whole of Europe.

Details of the new security systemic model of Europe and Prussia in particular are formed within the referred context. The main axis of Friedrich II's conception shall be in line with the unified political interests of Europe. Subsequently, a specific and unequivocal answer shall be given to the question - what makes Europe concerned from the political and geostrategic point of view.

This is a difficult question. Everyone has an unequivocal answer – the Ottoman Empire stretched over three continents, causing disturbance to Europe twice through European expeditions. Herein, without the courage and devotion of the King of Poland Jan Sobieski the Islamization of Europe would have been inevitable.

Therefore, the main conceptual strategy of Friedrich II should be saturated with an anti-osmotic mood. This anti-osmotic mood unites the whole of Europe.

Conceptual strategy is defined, now the main task is how to implement the idea. The most important detail - Friedrich II is fascinated by the role of the Gray Eminence, the interests of Prussia should not be explicitly expressed. Therefore, Prussia as a direct participant and executor of this concept should be ruled out and remain incognito.

The strive for the role of the Gray Eminence in Russia's internal politics can be perceived from the 40-ies of the XVIII century when Empress Elizabeth chooses a bride for her nephew, the future Emperor of Russia - Peter III. Germany traditionally supplies various Imperial courts with brides. Hence, it is not surprising that a German bride was quite desirable for the Imperial Court of St.

Petersburg. Friedrich did not oppose it. It is still somehow peculiar that the King of Prussia absolutely rules out the possibility of his sister becoming a wife of a future Emperor of Russia taking into account that it is rather favorable for him if Sofia becomes the Queen of Russia.

Obviously, it is easier for Friedrich to pursue German interests through his sisters, however, the King of Prussia totally rejects this easy option. It raises suspicion since the stated psychological moods make us believe that inspiration is of paramount importance for Friedrich and the desire for the latter makes clear his motivations of being a Gray Eminence.

It is obvious that for inspiration purposes its main opponent Austria (whose emperor is a Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation at the same time) shall be the central figure of the concept. This is the main condition for inspiration.

The involvement of Austria in this project and its activation is rather easy, since the Austrian Empire suffers from Ottoman aggression the most, as it directly borders the Ottoman Empire and the latter's desire to expand European domains directly through Austrian territories and conquer the Balkans. In fact, it was clearly seen that only the Balkans were not enough for the Ottomans and they wanted to conquer Vienna as well.

Within this context, the idea of distributing the Ottoman Empire with Russia is quite fascinating for Austria [26, p. 29-35].

These complicated schemes ensured the withdrawal of Russian troops from Berlin after the enthronement of Peter III. This fact is explained in historiography rather easily - Peter III is of German origin and a great admirer of Friedrich II. These sympathies preconditioned his unusual decision.

We believe that Peter's kindness alone should not be the reason for such a strange decision. We have studied the treaties of Prussia and Russia of 1762 and 1764, making it evident how Prussia arranges relations with the Russians through money [35, p. 407; 36, p. 19]. Consequently, we believe benevolence is just a cover to wrap up a financial transaction. The monetary transaction naturally played a significant role. One of the consequences of the referred deal was the withdrawal of the Russian army from Berlin.

Here is another important detail to note. The unusual decision of the Emperor of Russia was soon followed by the overthrow of the Imperial Court in St. Petersburg, which resulted in the assassination of Peter III and the enthronement of his wife Sophia Frederica Augusta von Anhalt-Zerbster (of German origin), later Catherine II.

There is an opinion in Russian publications that Friedrich the Great was behind this Coup D'état. This is not the subject of our research and therefore we will not review the issue in detail, however, we believe this idea has a right to exist, considering that Peter III is an undesirable figure on the Russian throne for Friedrich after the Seven Years' War [37, p. 62-93].

It is somehow surprising - Peter III, who in fact allowed Friedrich to maintain his physical existence, and whose strange and unprecedented decision saved the Kingdom of Prussia from destruction, becomes an unacceptable figure for Friedrich II.

This paradox should be explained. We think that Friedrich achieved the maximum results from Peter III. Because of this decision or deal the new emperor becomes completely unacceptable to Russia, as it is no longer suitable for further plans. The reason is simple – Russia did not forgive the

Emperor the concession of conquered Europe, hence the attitude towards him was rather aggressive throughout the whole empire. Evidently, Peter, discredited in Russia, could not be the ally of Friedrich and could not be used for any other case, as preaching any idea through Peter desirable to Friedrich is doomed to discredit. The statement of Shakespeare "The Moor has done his job, the Moor must go ..." works meticulously in this case.

It is crucial for Friedrich to create a systemic model that virtually precludes the continuation of Russian aggression in the European direction.

Obviously, the withdrawal of Peter III from Berlin was not just a result of financial interest. He has a specific idea behind him. This is an anti-osmotic campaign. The concept - Russia should lead the European anti-osmotic campaign - emerges within this context. Naturally, Russia itself should be convinced that the Turkish option is better than aggression against Europe. Hence, by fulfilling the eternal dream of Russians to control Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits it will obtain a great income and the world economy lever as well. This is the tool enabling Russia to control not only Europe but the world as well [72, p. 95-105].

Friedrich II took proper care to offer Russia a concept that would not oppose the great powers. In this regard, the idea of an anti-osmotic campaign was a certain optimal plan being within the interests of all European states (large or small). It is noteworthy that Friedrich II is quite filigree in his understanding of every detail.

Forcing anti-osmotic campaign by Russia is favorable to following states:

1. The Austrian Empire, which is directly adjacent to the Ottoman Empire. Vienna was twice besieged by the Ottomans. The Ottomans constantly threatened the Balkan possessions of Austria.
2. England, as a marine state, as the weakening of the Ottoman Empire was in fact a guarantee to control the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits.
3. France, although it has close diplomatic and trade relations with the Ottomans, Versailles needs a certain balancing tool to maintain the existing relations.
4. The Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. The only way to survive is the creation of a Unified Caucasian State opposed by the systemic mechanism developed by the Ottoman Empire and the international Peace of Amasya.
5. Prussia itself, which is abandoned by the Russian troops and enabled to exist as a kingdom.

As for Russia itself, confrontation with the Ottomans is a politically undefeated game. As far as its ideological postulate - the intercession of the Greeks, the defense of Christianity, in case of a prudent policy will inevitably bring the desired result. This result may not be instantaneous due to the strength of the Ottoman Empire, however, even failure in the long run gives quite a solid handicap in terms of the internal turmoil of the Ottoman state. We refer to the inhabitants of the multinational and different areas of the Ottoman Empire, who traditionally pose problems for the strength of a united state. Stimulating their anti-osmotic sentiments is precisely the tool that can cause problems to state resilience, which is directly proportional to the attitude towards the external threat posed to the resilience of the country.



The anti-osmotic campaign, planned in a form of a Greek Project at the end of the Seven Years' War, differs significantly from the previous anti-osmotic movement. The main focus is to divide the European part of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, it is planned not to directly annex the referred territory, but to create a buffer state of Dacia and restore the Byzantine Empire [39, p. 5-11; 87, p. 35-37]. The Russian Empress considers her grandson Constantine to be the Emperor of the referred Empire. Therefore, Constantine is brought up in a Greek manner [16, p. 352-360]. This is a project that acquires a kind of conceptual form and acts during the post-Russian period for almost a century and a half, including World War I.

The Greek Project, forcing an anti-osmotic campaign, was a special opportunity for Georgia. It is necessary to list the systemic problems created by the Ottoman Empire during the gradual conquests of the Caucasus in order to clearly present a new important political initiative for Georgia.

1. Amasya International System, which involved the division of Georgia with the Kingdom of Iran. The Amasya system of 1555 was the optimal concession the Ottoman Empire agreed. The Peace of Amasya made it actually impossible to unite eastern and western Georgia [78, p. 20-32]. The United Georgia is a phenomenon that has two important trump cards from the state's point of view - control of Dariali passes and access to the sea. That was on the one hand the most important lever in the ancient and medieval world history against world empires and on the other hand, the most important systemic precondition for state and economic development.

The Caucasus, divided between Iran and the Ottomans, was a reality recognized by the rest of the world. Accordingly, one more important problem can be perceived as well.

2. Unlike previous centuries, when Georgia claimed to be one of the most important states in the world, the latter actually forgot that there was once an independent state in the Caucasus after the introduction of the Amasya International System. Only the special activity of the Georgian Church and its response to the latter reminded the world of the existence of Georgia as a cultural and confessional space.

For the world empires, it was a desired model that gave a real chance to seize the most important strategic points of the Caucasus, which was a favorable lever to dominate the world economy and politics. In such a case, if any state in the long run wanted to break the model of Amasya, it did not think for the welfare of Georgia, but to take the place of the invader and propose the most important strategic points.

3. The Amasya system posed another systemic threat - actually blocked the Caucasus region from Europe and isolated them within the Muslim surroundings from a cultural and political point of view.

The most important part of the Caucasus was surrounded by Muslims, minimizing the geographical area it could connect with the Christian world. The main focus shifted to the integration of the Caucasus into the Muslim world. This meant the destruction of the unique Georgian culture and mental foundations and the creation of a new cultural space completely different from Christianity and unacceptable as well.

4. The Ottoman Empire took care to deprive united Georgia of the most essential source of economic development of the state - access to the sea and to neutralize the most significant state lever,

which gave the state in the Caucasus the opportunity to have influence over the world empires. The North Caucasus was separated from Georgian governmental and cultural space. The Christian mountaineers living there were converted to Islam. A special focus was directed on Dagestan, which was the main satellite of the Ottomans against the state system in the Caucasus. This was the most important pincer for the Caucasus guaranteeing a systematic irreversible process of the Caucasus' integration into the Muslim cultural or political world.

5. The Ottoman Empire destroyed the unique Georgian social landscape in the world, which was the main support of Georgian statehood in the history of Georgia. Unlike other cultural or political worlds, the main feature of statehood in Georgia was the open social environment, which allowed any worthy person to rise to a higher social class. The Bagrationis understood that they could not resist the great political interests of the world's most powerful states without common interests and a consolidated society. Hence, social relations, different from the world political reality are established. For example it was a common rule in Europe that during military operations and the war, the king should be specially protected. However, in Georgia, the king was on the front line of the battle showing other warriors an example of courage and devotion. Hence, the main feature of society is outlined - any warrior is a supporter of the king and not a representative of a different social class. He is the patron and not the lord. Based on such a different mentality the social oppression of people in Georgia did not take a systemic shape. The mentioned fact has made the Bagrationis the only royal dynasty in the world history of all time not to have had their own people revolt. All social classes feel the king's service and benevolence, therefore people also support the government as far as possible. This mood has created a unique social landscape in Georgia.

This unique social landscape became one of the main targets for the Ottoman Empire to enhance their positions in the Caucasus. They took advantage of the fact that the Amasya system had actually hampered the economic development of the Caucasus region. Feudals no longer had the income from the Silk Road, though they had the same demands and aspirations. To meet these economic needs, most of the Feudals of Western Georgia, including the royal court, make the unworthy decision to become a customer and an organic part of the Ottoman slave market.

Naturally, the most important question is what were the changes in the Caucasus after Russia took orientation towards the Greek Project. Greek Project was gradually formed and acquired its final shape in the 80s in terms of form and content. Prior to this, it was a search process, the political arena was quite flexible, ruling out any rigidity. Any model must be adapted to reality. Hence, the Russian policy is determined by the referred context.

Kingdoms of Caucasus are considered to be the allies of the Austrian Empire in terms of the actual execution of the Greek Project. They should be the allies of Russia. Otherwise, it is actually impossible, as far as it is incredible, to fulfill Russian foreign plans and fight against the Ottomans alone, without an ally. World history remembers the only precedent for self-isolation and the attempt to solve great foreign problems alone – it was the case of Jalal Ad-Din, who loathed all potential allies and attempted to solve all grand plans alone.

Scales are different here, more grandiose, in fact, it is a continuation of the world redistribution that dates back to 1762. These geopolitical multidisciplinary directions need a global approach in order to rule out the dismissal of using any possible chance.

Relations between Russia and Georgia during this period should be considered within this context. The main task is to replace the results of the successful military operations that Russia has achieved by the project of Friedrich II. Friedrich occupies important strategic places in Europe and he has to offer specific territories to Russia in return.

New shapes of Russia's Caucasian policy are perceived within the context of the Greek Project from the 60-ies of the XVIII century that differs completely from the previous political games. Despite the news, it is clear that Russia spent a lot of time on preparing for these games - the attitude of Peter the Great towards Vakhtang VI, the adventure that actually embroiled the Georgian political space already full of internal contradictions – all this was activated from that period.

The descendants of Vakhtang VI are special trump cards for Catherine [70, p. 76-85; 38, p. 122-143]. It is noteworthy that these political games with a strategic point of view almost repeat the idea of an intra-dynastic coup. The order of the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg is obvious - unrest on the royal throne of Kartli-Kakheti, the dethronement of Erekle, demand for legitimacy. Hence, a new wave starts against Erekle. In 1765, Erekle is confronted by his uncle, Paata Batonishvili, the illegitimate son of Vakhtang VI [83, p. 56-68].

This is a scenario that was played at the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg three years before, the acting characters are different, but the goal is the same - a Coup D'etat. The most strange is that the peasantry is artificially involved in these political processes - the peasantry confronts the king, who cares the most to avoid a social gap and precipice in the state. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Paata Batonishvili is supported by the lower social class.

This raises special suspicions - there has been no peasant uprising in Georgia before or since. (Certainly, I do not mean the social movement that began in the XIX century, which was referred to as a peasants' war in Soviet historiography, in our opinion it was a qualitatively different form of the national liberation movement).

Such confrontation has no basis in Georgia - there are no historical or public precedents for social confrontation. There is only a political order, unequivocally initiated by the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg. Confrontation of Paata Batonishvili is stimulated by the upper echelons of Russia.

This is a rather difficult period for Erekle, during this period, his father Teimuraz II passed away in 1762 and was the main supporter of his policy. It was not a homogeneous policy - the multi-faceted reality was reasonably prescribed in the strategic plans of father and son. That formed one of the most interesting models of a balanced policy to govern a country in the history of diplomacy.

The strategic direction of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire envisages the seizure and subsequent control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. The main direction of the intra-Caucasian policy of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti is the creation of a United Caucasian State, which is based on the systemic model of a United Georgia (dating back to David the Builder) as a state security model.

Certainly, the strategic goal of Russia's foreign policy will not be fulfilled, it will not be able to seize the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits without occupying the Caucasus, the geographical space

considered by Erekle as a United Caucasian State.

We should find out whether the incompatible reality and such different conceptual goals gave a chance to the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti to become allies. Accordingly, a certain answer must be given to the question: what would make the interests of Kartli-Kakheti and the Russian Empire coincide?

On the one hand, as a result of the world-historical process of that period and on the other hand, a situational analysis of the policy of the Russian Empire and the Georgian kingdoms, we came to the conclusion that there were three possible variations of the alliance between Russia and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti:

1. If Russia renounced its imperial policy, it would recognize the intra-Caucasian policy of Kartli-Kakheti and accept the establishment of a United Caucasus State.
2. If the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and later the United Caucasus State became the executor of the will of the Russian Empire, a puppet.
3. If the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti voluntarily renounced its independence and voluntarily became an integral part of the Russian Empire.

The first option must be totally ruled out, as there is no evidence that Russia has ever renounced its strategic foreign policy goal of conquering the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Accordingly, it could not fulfill its plans without conquering the Caucasus or creating puppet kingdoms in this geographical area.

The events of the 60-80-ies in the XVIII century actually showed that kingdoms of the Caucasus could not accept the status of a puppet [77, p. 12-21]. Naturally, Russia should try this option as well. We believe this was the issue the Imperial Court of Russia tried to clarify with Totleben's famous provocations during the Russo-Turkish war. It was a test that had to be given a specific answer, whether an obedient puppet state, an unconditional executor of Russia's will, could be created in the Caucasus. The Imperial Court of St. Petersburg received an unequivocal answer through the reaction of the Georgians to Totleben's adventure - a Russian puppet state could not exist on the territory of Georgia.

The Russian project to restore the Armenian state in the late 80-ies of the XVIII century considering Potemkin as king, was a part of a similar strategic plan. At the same time, a project to create the United States of Kartli-Kakheti and Armenia also existed. The Russian provocations and the idea of Potemkin's reign in Armenia were directed against the referred plan.

The third option of an alliance between Russia and Kartli-Kakheti was particularly fascinating for the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg. According to the third option, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti should renounce its independence and become part of the Russian Empire voluntarily.

That is why the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg launches a new project, which can be conventionally called Totleben 2. It sends to the royal court of Erekle another adventurer, the German physician Jakob Reinegs. Russia wants to achieve exactly the same goals by means of Reinegs as in the case of Totleben but uses a different tactic. Reinegs has studied Georgian ethnopsychology,

Georgian moods, and mentality and uses them to achieve the desired result. His tactical strategy also includes Georgian patriotism - for example, he encourages young Alexander Batonishvili to rally his army and start a war against the Ottoman Empire, a unique possibility of self-destruction. In order to disguise its insidious policies, Reinegs also assists Erekle carry out reforms and offers relations with Europe as well. He needs to disguise his real purpose. The real goal is evident –persuade Erekle to conclude a treaty with Russia, which is the first necessary step taken by Russia for the international isolation and annexation of Georgia.

However, Reinegs is not the only hope for the Imperial Court of Russia. The latter creates a supportive background to easily achieve the goal with various intrigues and international strategies. The murder of Levan Batonishvili, the poisoning of Prince George, the murders of the Capuchin ambassadors sent to Europe by Erekle, the involvement of Vakhtang's descendants, and tension of internal dynastic relations, publishing the works of Alexander Amilakhvari to discredit the Bagrationis [75, p 57-59].

The combination of these measures had its outcome and the project of the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg came true. Erekle asked Russia to conclude an alliance agreement himself [17, p. 40-44]. On the one hand, Russia recognized the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and on the other hand retained the right to violate this paragraph legally and interfere in Georgian affairs.

It is also noteworthy that St. Petersburg continues its relationship with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in a similar manner after the death of Erekle. It tries to get a proposal from Giorgi XII to make the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti part of Russia; however, despite using internal controversies and a variety of intrigues, the latter fails to achieve any results. This means that Russia has no official proof that it did not conquer the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti voluntarily relinquished its independence. The absence of this official evidence is a solid basis for historiography to assess the abolition of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti by Russia as an unconditional annexation.

Without the Greek project, it is impossible to explain Erekle's multifaceted diplomatic moves, quite compromising and deliberate relations with the rulers of the Russian Empire, and frequent endurance of personal insults.

Such a deliberate policy of Erekle towards Russia originates from state thinking. Erekle never puts his royal ambitions above the interests of the state, he never acts solely based on personal feelings and emotions. It is obvious from his appeasable and deliberate actions, that he is waiting for something important for his country.

The Greek Project has to ensure benefits that are the main motivation for King Erekle's patience. The referred benefits for the country make Erekle endure repeated personal insults from Russia. State interest is of paramount importance for Erekle. This is the thesis drawing a red line throughout the life of the King of Kartli-Kakheti. From this viewpoint, it is quite interesting what where the benefits expected by Georgian Royal Court and Feudal Society from Russia for such inhuman patience.

This question is answered by the Russian-Austrian Greek project. If implementing the latter:

1. Elimination of external factors hindering the unification of western and eastern Georgia seemed quite real.

2. Most part of the Caucasus would be within the environment of Christians minimizing the geographical area for the Christian community that may be threatened by Muslims.

3. By neutralizing the Ottoman Imperial Syndrome, the North Caucasus would return to the Caucasian cultural environment, part of which, especially Dagestan, became the satellite of the Ottomans. Consequently, the passes from the North Caucasus would become a part of the unified Caucasian political area.

4. By neutralizing the Ottoman Imperial Syndrome, it would be possible to restore the unprecedented unique Georgian social landscape existing in the world being the main pillar of Georgian statehood throughout the Georgian history.

5. In case of neutralizing the Ottoman threat, a unified Caucasian political space would gain distinct economic incentives and opportunities, through transferring the eastern shores of the Black Sea under the influence of the latter since the referred area gave the possibility to develop active trade relations with Western European countries.

6. Christian globalization and a peaceful political environment would create a quite fertile prospect for the restoration of the Silk Road, which would be especially beneficial not only for Kartli-Kakheti and other Georgian kingdoms but for the whole region as well.

7. According to the Greek Project, as a result of such political, social, and cultural impulses, a secure geopolitical environment would be formed around the Caucasus, which gave the whole region a chance to regain its geopolitical function of world importance, to make the dream of Georgian kings of all time come true.

## Conclusion

The results of the Seven Years' War have had the greatest impact on the political processes and the further development of Georgia and the Caucasus region.

1. The main ideological product of the Seven Years' War - the Greek Project aimed at neutralizing Ottoman aggression - was a model of European redistribution and its successful implementation depended on the existence of a Unified Caucasian State. Consequently, there was a chance for Europe to reconsider its imperial attitudes towards the Caucasus region.

2. Based on the outcomes the Seven Years' War, the concept of Friedrich II regarding the Russian political strategy and European territorial arrangement provided a unique opportunity for Erekle II to convince European states of the need for a Unified Caucasian State.

3. The only European state that, deemed it necessary (due to its own interests) to show solidarity with the Caucasus region and to support Erekle II was the Austrian Empire, whose Emperor Joseph II was at the same time the Holy Roman Emperor. The Georgian-Austrian political concept was a mutually beneficial model, which was, on the one hand, a guarantee and a precondition for the security of the Caucasus region, and on the other hand, for the qualitatively more active phase of the Holy Roman Empire.

4. France, Prussia, England, and the Russian Empire could not resist the desire to seize and

directly conquer the most important territories of the Caucasus, being the confessional and political conglomerate. Consequently, they preferred not to favor the state in the Caucasus, but to annex it, thus losing a unique chance to neutralize the Ottoman Empire.

5. The imperial attitudes and sentiments of the Russian Empire and all the European states, except for the Austrian Empire unequivocally prevented the implementation of the political concept of Friedrich II - the Greek Project. Therefore, the Ottoman aggression continued for a century and a half and a systematic solution to this problem was found only after the end of the First World War.

6. The main ideological product of the Seven Years' War, the Greek Project, proved to be the key to the history of Georgia in the 50-90-ies of the XVIII century providing the possibility to explain all political processes happening in the Caucasus during this period.

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