



Migration and Xenophobic Manifestations in South Africa, 2008-2016

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Abstract:

The aim of this piece was to examine the nature of the relationship between migration, identity and xenophobic manifestations in Africa. While xenophobic manifestations continue to be strongly entrenched in developed countries, increasing incidents have been reported in developing African countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, and particularly in South Africa. The past violent outbreaks of xenophobic attacks, which resulted in the deaths of many foreign nationals in South Africa, threaten not only the lives and livelihoods of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other locally defined 'outsiders' including domestic migrants and ethnic minorities, but also the health, education, tourism and economic sectors of our "Rainbow Nation". The research adopted the Frustration Aggression Theory and the exploratory design as its theoretical framework and research design respectively. It gathered data secondarily, and the data were analysed with the content analysis method. The study showed that xenophobia will continue to undermine the rights of migrants and bedevil efforts to maximise the development potentials of migration in the continent of Africa. It recommended that Government should monitor and report bias-motivated violence against migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless and internally displaced persons, by maintaining official systems of monitoring and public reporting to provide accurate data for informed policy decisions to combat such violence.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Across the world, millions of people live outside their countries of origin. For many, migration offers the potential for protection from crises, escape from poverty, and inflation. However, with increased migration flows, the world has also witnessed the exacerbation of existing xenophobia and xenophobic discrimination across the globe. The fact that international law neither defines xenophobia nor xenophobic discrimination is one issue that has remained a source of concern. The Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, of 2001, acknowledged xenophobia as one of the main contemporary sources and forms of discrimination and conflict, which required urgent attention and prompt action by States, as well as by the international community.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) increasingly recognises that xenophobia's various manifestations represent actual potential threats to its persons of concern (PoC): refugees, stateless persons, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons. Xenophobia's expressions range from discriminatory attitudes and remarks to institutional or social exclusion, harassment and overt forms of interpersonal and collective violence. Xenophobic attacks targeting PoC to UNHCR have recently occurred in all five geographic regions within its operational field. These include, inter alia, Colombians in Ecuador and Costa Rica; Zimbabweans, Nigerians, Somalis, Pakistanis and other refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa Somalis and people from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Kenya; the Rohingya in Myanmar; and asylum seekers in Greece. This situation gravely concerns UNHCR and its partners.

Statement of the Problem

The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, leaving 60 people dead and thousands displaced in its wake, sent shock waves through the country, Africa and across the globe. For almost 15 years, since the birth of democracy, South Africa was hailed as an example of racial reconciliation — a beacon of hope for many of its own as well as those who supported the country through its struggle for freedom. Fellow Africans were stunned - how was it possible that the very people who accommodated and cared for South Africans during the dark years of apartheid could all of a sudden become the enemy? Even today, that question has not been satisfactorily answered. The seminar paper is an attempt at answering that question. The targets of the xenophobic violence were mainly foreigners from other African countries, although South Africans made up one-third of the dead. The violence started in Alexandra Township in Johannesburg before spreading to other townships, mainly in the province of Gauteng and in and around the cities of Cape Town and Durban. Many of the 140 affected areas were townships and so-called informal settlements. However, the 2008 xenophobic riots are best understood if envisaged as a specific moment of crisis along a broader continuum of low-intensity violence emerging in the mid-1990s and manifesting itself regularly after 2008: in 2010, 2013 and again in March and April 2015.

This now seemingly deeply-rooted expression of rejection has led some analysts in South Africa to consider xenophobic violence as one idiom in the growing repertoire of protest (Von Holdt & Alexander, 2012). Cases of mass violence against groups considered as foreign to the national body or the local community that has emerged in several other African countries (Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya) have been labelled not as “xenophobic” but rather as about “ethnic cleansing”, “religious riots”, “communal clashes” or “autochthonous or indigenous conflicts”. These different labels, which reveal the multiple manners in which citizenship, state institutions and social relationships have been historically constructed in different countries, need to be interrogated. Viewed from outside the

continent, envisaging these manifestations of group violence could lead to an analytical bias: the risk of considering the continent (except for its most industrialised countries like South Africa) as more prone to a specific type of belonging divorced from other historical trends; in other words, as a continent, is dominated by “ethnic”, “religious” and “first-corner claims” rooted in the past as opposed to other, regions, mainly the ‘West (and South Africa), that is characterized by nationalism and “non-ethnic” citizenship associated with’ territory through the place of birth and/or residence (Zenker 2011). Consequent to the above, this research seeks to establish the peculiarities of xenophobia in South Africa between 2008 and

2018

Objectives of the Study

The study shall attempt to realise the following objectives.

1. To show the root causes and patterns of migration in South Africa
2. To interrogate identity and xenophobic manifestations in South Africa
3. To interrogate the peculiar nature of xenophobia in South Africa

Research Questions

For this study to adequately achieve its objectives, it must try to answer the following question.

- 1 What are the root causes and patterns of migration in South Africa?
- 2 What is the nature of identity and xenophobic manifestations in South Africa?
- 3 What are the peculiarities of xenophobia in South Africa?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Xenophobia

Notwithstanding its extensive usage, xenophobia is an ambiguous and contested term in common, policy and academic debates. The word xenophobia is derived from the Greek words ‘Xeno’, meaning stranger or foreigner, and ‘phobia’, meaning fear. It means ‘unreasonable fear and dislike of foreigners or strangers’ (Nyamnjoh. 2006). Some scholars consider it to be intense dislike, hatred or fear of others (Crowther 2006, p. 185, Hunt 1996). Others only recognise it when it manifests itself as a visible hostility towards strangers or that which is deemed foreign (Stolcke, 1999). Azindow (2007, p.98) describe xenophobia as discrimination towards foreigners or strangers. According to the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), xenophobia is defined as” the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (Bekker, and Carlton 2010, p.127). This is manifested in individuals who could be, for instance, the same colour as the local inhabitants. There are also ongoing debates on whether xenophobia originates at the individual or collective level (Berezip, 2006). While these definitions are unified by a generalised recognition that xenophobia is a set of attitudes and/or practices surrounding people’s origins, the precise locus of xenophobia is highly contextualised.

Despite the different explanations of xenophobia, it is understood as a violation of human dignity and human rights in keeping with Article 26 of 1998 of the United Nations (UN), which declares racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia as human rights violations (Bustamante 2002, p.337). As a societal issue, numerous studies have established that xenophobia is deep-rooted in many sectors of South African society, including government, media and financial organisations (Dodson & Oelofse

2000). Bond et al. (2010) & Vale (2002) rightly assert that political xenophobic arrogance and attacks against foreigners are based and rooted in the politics that marked the apartheid and post-apartheid leadership and influenced public policy toward African foreigners that filtered in post-apartheid South Africa.

Xenophobia: A Global Phenomenon

Historically, xenophobia did not start in South Africa; Australia, North America, Europe, the United Kingdom, Japan and others have had long histories of xenophobia (Mayfield, 2010). In Rome for example, xenophobic tendencies were manifested towards the Russians and Hungarians who were not citizens but from neighbouring countries (Saideman & Ayres, 2008, p.1 55-160). In Australia, though it is a multicultural society, xenophobia sentiments were manifested towards immigrants. Foreign nationals were seen at all times as criminals or asylum seekers. The situation was worsened by the fact that the government and opposition parties took advantage of these immigrants by indulging in the loathing of refugees (Buchanan, 2003, p.7). France, which was once a white and Catholic country anti-immigrant sentiments were directed or developed following the presence of the Muslims in particular and other races. Xenophobia in France became widespread to the extent that French citizens were blaming the increased unemployment and insecurity on foreign nationals (Roemer et al., 2007, p.237-247). The result was the tightening up of security (immigration laws) by the French government as foreign nationals were called criminals. The French and the British for fear of contamination of their culture by nationals coming from other continents such as Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, established more stringent immigration laws, which were passed restricting the number of foreign nationals coming from those continents (Campbell, 2003, p 77).

In the USA, xenophobic assaults are manifested in the form of anti-Hispanic hate crimes (Stacey et al., 2011, pp.287-294). Research has it that xenophobia in the USA from a historical perspective started as far back as the 19th century. In 1885, it was reported that White Americans rioted against Chinese residents. Again in 1890, another incident of Xenophobic attacks on the Chinese was reported where white farm workers assaulted their Chinese counterparts. The Americans attitude towards Mexicans, Italians, and Asians, shows that they are not welcomed in the USA. Xenophobic assaults against Mexicans became rife in 1914. During this period in America, only foreign nationals from Germany, England, French-speaking Canadians and Jews, were welcomed to the USA (Fetzer, 2000, pp.31-33). In view of Mikulich (2009, p.4), U.S.A. xenophobia, based on the assumption that 'our country' is defined by, and should maintain, its dominant White European heritage is rooted in the myth of the U.S. as a nation of European immigrants. This situation represses America's original sin of racism and obscures the fact the country was in part built, advanced and sustained on the backs of African people who were stripped from their cultures of birth and arrived involuntarily via the Atlantic slave trade. Xenophobic inclination was expressed in India targeting mostly foreign nationals from Bangladesh who were accused by, the Indians for the country's predicament such as increased unemployment, terrorism and environmental degradation. Just as in the case of South Africa, the numbers of Bangladesh foreign nationals in India were most often than not, portrayed as a national threat to the country by government officials. One peculiar thing regarding xenophobia in India was that xenophobic assaults against Bangladeshi vary according to religious backgrounds. Xenophobic violence targeted against foreign nationals in, both South Africa and India are similar in the sense that it was founded on 'politics of exclusion' and again associated with post-independence and nation-building (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010, pp.214-217, Human Rights Watch, 1998, p.18-20).

Coming to Africa, Nigeria and Ghana have had records of hatred for foreign immigrants, which ended up with xenophobia (Campbell, 2003, p.74). Xenophobic inclinations in Ghana became high in 1969 to the extent that the Ghanaian government had to evict and expel a total number of 1.5 million foreign nationals particularly Nigerians. Research has it that in 1983, the Nigerian government evicted 1.5 million foreigners from Nigeria who were mainly Ghanaians (Campbell, 2003, p.74). The xenophobic inclination in both countries was spurred by economic difficulties confronting them. Nationals of both countries (Ghana and Nigeria in 1969 and 1983, respectively) accused each other of responsibility for their predicaments (Soyombo, 2008, pp.94-95).

Migration in Africa

In today's increasingly interconnected world, international migration has become a reality that touches nearly all corners of the globe, often making distinctions, between countries of origin, transit and destination obsolete. Modern transportation has made it easier, cheaper and faster for people to move. At the same time conflict, poverty, inequality and lack of decent jobs are among the reasons that compel people to leave their homes in search of better futures for themselves and

their families. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development in both home and host communities. In 2014, migrants from developing countries sent home the estimated US \$436 billion in remittances; a 4.4 per cent increase over the 2013 level (World Bank 2015), far exceeding official development assistance and, excluding China, foreign direct investment. These funds are, often used to improve the livelihoods of families and communities through investments in education, health, sanitation, housing and infrastructure. Countries of destination can also benefit from migration. In countries of destination, migrants often fill critical labour shortages, create jobs as entrepreneurs, and contribute in terms of taxes and social security contributions. Migrants, as some of the most dynamic members of society, can also forge new paths in science, medicine and technology and enrich their host communities by promoting cultural diversity.

Despite the many benefits of migration, migrants themselves remain among the most vulnerable members of society. They are often the first to lose their job in the event of an economic downturn, often working for less pay, for longer hours, and in worse conditions than national workers. While for many migrations 'is an empowering experience, others endure human rights violations, abuse and discrimination. Migrants, particularly women and children, are too often victims of human trafficking and the heinous forms of exploitation that human trafficking entails. Further, in many parts of the world, migration remains one of the few options for people, particularly young people, to find decent work, and escape poverty, persecution and violence (Fred, 2015).

Identity Issues

The issue of identity in Africa is a very serious one. And the reason is simple. The history of Africa was forged without the conscious contributions of Africans. The scramble for Africa which was a product of colonial and imperialistic conquest forced people of various nationalities and histories together. The search for identity has always been a key issue facing mankind in its striving for significance and meaning. However, the African understanding of self is in crisis having been assailed from several directions. Maathai (2004) has opined that if Africa is to build for the future it must first face its past. She went further to say that Africa's colonial history was a disastrous period for the continent and how many of the problems faced by its people today stem from that past. It tells of

Africa's loss of identity under its colonial occupiers and the disintegration of social hierarchies that had developed over centuries. The resulting crisis of leadership, corruption and a reluctance to relinquish power has stunted development. Puppet governments, the exploitation of the continent's abundant natural resources and the use of African nations as a buffer against eastern communism or western capitalism have left Africa both physically and psychologically scarred.

Note that before the advent of the Europeans the status of the individual or the self in African socio-ethical thought is reflected in the communitarian features of social structures. This stems from the very essence of the African's cosmic vision which is not one 'where the universe is understood as something discrete and individuated but rather, it is conceived of as a series of interactions and interconnections. This general cosmic vision is particularly applicable in coming to an understanding of the relationship between self and community. Tempels (1959) captures the essence of such thinking when he points out that Bantu psychology cannot conceive of man as an individual, as a force existing by itself and apart from its, ontological relationship with other living beings. Insisting on the sociality of the self, he states that "the Bantu cannot be a tone being." Further, he observes that for the Bantu, "every individual forms a link in a chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below the line of his descendants."

Diaspora

Given that the number of displaced persons has currently reached an all-time high, it is hardly surprising that globally diaspora studies have been proliferating across disciplines. Although there is no consensus on what diaspora entails, two broad interlocking streams have emerged, clustered around the transnational and the cultural aspects of the diaspora experience. In addition, a shift from a focus on displacement and uprooting to connectivity and affiliation has been identified, from a 'fixation on homeland' to 'making one's home'.

Many countries have very large and significant diasporas, which tend to be quite spread out around different areas of the world. We focus on seven groups of countries containing developing nations. These groups are emerging Europe (which we define as all Eastern European countries plus Turkey), emerging Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Central America and the Caribbean (including Mexico). There are about 45 million migrants around the world from emerging Europe. The homologous number is 70 million for emerging Asia, 25 million for the Middle East and North Africa, close to 25 million for sub-Saharan Africa, 12 million for South America, and 25 million for Central America and the Caribbean. Migrants from developing countries account for about 200 million migrants out of a total of 250 million migrants in the world.

The first question to ask is: Why should there be policies in place for this matter? The answer is straightforward: Migrants play a role in many important aspects of economic development by lowering existing frictions in markets. For example, remittances could alleviate credit constraints for small or family businesses. Similarly, diasporas can alleviate frictions in the form of informal institutions and non-tariff trade barriers, or lower the cost of diffusion of tacit knowledge by reducing the uncertainty in the process of knowledge transmission. As discussed, migrants have proved to be a good vehicle in overcoming these frictions, but there are certainly cases in which frictions are too costly for migrants to deal with alone. Thus, public policy might play a role in encouraging diasporas to overcome frictions in particular instances where the stakes, and costs, are higher. In the next section, we explore a number of policy options available to governments, particularly in emerging markets that could

counteract frictions by putting in place a structure of incentives for Diasporas.

III. Theoretical Framework

The study adopts the Frustration-Aggression theory. The theory proffers significant explanations on activities that may lead to aggression or violence, as in the case of xenophobic violence. The relevance of this theory to this seminar is that it would show how xenophobic violence is a product of accumulated frustrations caused by issues of migration and identity. The frustration-aggression theory explains a feeling of tension in the state of mind and wellbeing of individuals or groups as a result of prolonged hindrance in the attainment of certain goals. It noted that frustration sets in given the mindset and in most cases this frustrating situation results or gives birth to anger which can further lead to aggression or violence. Frustration-aggression theory, therefore, explains a condition that 'arises when circumstances prevent individuals or groups as identified above in goal attainment over a period. The 'totality of frustrating circumstances resulting in the perceived aggressive situation is dependent on how closely goal attainment is before the supposed denial (Harris, 1974).

This theory was propounded by Dollard, Miller, Mowrer and Sears, 1939. Dollard led a research group at the Yale Institute of Human Relations and published a monograph that is useful in explaining human conflict behaviour. It is based on a simple and straightforward hypothesis that human frustration may lead to aggressive behaviour. Since the development of the theory, several scholars have analysed it. For example, it was observed that frustration ultimately leads to aggression and aggression always implies that frustration has occurred at some previous time (Lawson, 1965). Gurr (1970) suggested that "relative deprivation", or a subjective sense of being deprived of certain needs or freedoms by a domestic or international governing body, can result in feelings of frustration. If these feelings of frustration are not handled with care, it will eventually escalate to violence and terrorism

IV. Methodology

The research employs an exploratory design. To be sure, the exploratory research design focuses on gathering using unstructured format or procedures to interpret them, essentially to generate a course of action for decision making. This enables it to go beyond just the mere description of things to provide meaning. As McNabb (2004, p. 106) observed, one of the advantages of the' exploratory research design is that it helps in the building of theories and in predicting events. This study basically employs secondary sources of data collection. It derives its information from reputable books, articles, journals, and monographs. Although this information was carefully and objectively chosen by the researcher. The criterion for the choice of information is that it must match social realities. This research employs the content analysis method. It presents the observation of scholars and other commentators as existing in literature with utmost impartiality, and it avoids any form of distortion.

V. DISCUSSION

Root Causes and Patterns of Migration in Africa

Migration researcher. Landua (2011) have argued that violence against [black] immigrants to South Africa has been a permanent attribute across the apartheid and post-apartheid divide, where otherness/outsiderness, stereotypes, and structural exclusion prevent Immigrants from exercising political rights and rights to residence in the cities. (The combination of immigrant *rightlessness* and structural exclusion, amidst a perceived invasion of 'foreigners', resulted in organised social activism against individuals perceived as dangerous to the socio-cultural and moral fabric, and as threatening the economic opportunities of poor South Africans, within a system set up by wealthy South Africans to super exploit migrant labour from both South Africa and the wider region. Hence we require a

framework to incorporate not only the flows of labour, the reproduction of labour in housing (especially during an unprecedented real estate bubble), the nature of extremely competitive retail trade-in community reproduction, gender power delineations and regional geopolitics, but also the consciousness that arises from these socioeconomic relations, and the ways civil society organisations both contest the xenophobic reactions and in many cases fail to locate or address the root causes of xenophobia in structural oppressions.

South African has a long history of migration linked to the mining industry. Contract labour initially compelled migration from Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zambia — and of course India - to work in sugar cane fields of Natal from the 1840s onwards, and later on in diamond and gold mines in the 1870s in Kimberley and 1890s on the Witwatersrand. As Maharajj (2012) notes, ‘historically, the mining and agriculture sectors in South Africa have been dependent on migrant [abundant cheap] labour from southern African countries. In fact, much of South Africa’s mineral (and natural) wealth has been produced on the backs of migrant mineworkers” (p.2).

This tradition was recognised by Hlatshwayo in his overview of the history of migrant labour:

The history of migrant labour in Southern Africa is intricately tied to the uneven development of the capitalist mode of production at the onset of colonization. Because capitalist production started around plantation (agriculture) and mining concerns, it is these two sectors, and especially the latter, that played a dominant role in the evolution of migrant labour within the region. Labour migrancy in Southern Africa dates back to the 1850s when large numbers of men migrated to work in sugar plantations in Natal, where British colonial capitalism was taking shape. At this juncture, the hunting and ivory trade of Southern Mozambique was in decline.

But once the dynamic changed from migration based upon economic activity function to large scale capital to desperation-based refugee immigration over the past thirty years, official reaction changed dramatically: White-ruled South Africa aimed to reduce the latter, by electrifying the Mozambican border and, arresting and deporting asylum seekers despite Pretoria’s involvement in civil wars which pushed people to leave their countries of birth. Regrettably, immigration law remains one of the apartheid legacies that South Africa maintains, with slight changes, from which xenophobic attitudes grow and explode. At the same time, with apartheid giving way to a more legitimate process of business activity in South Africa, the ability of Johannesburg businesses to move into the region increased.

In general, the major factors prompting migration across are the huge disparities in earning potential between poor and rich countries. These differences reflect prospects for better employment opportunities, training and skill development, and, of course, higher incomes in more favourable socio-economic environments. In recent times, migration has been fuelled globally by access to information, declining costs of travel, demographic dynamics, labour demand and supply dynamics, and the economic return to labour in high-income countries (UN, 2007; OECD, 2005). In Africa, emigration pressure is fuelled by unstable politics, ethno-religious conflicts, poverty and rapidly growing populations. Rapid population and labour force growth have combined with persistent economic decline, huge external debt, retrenchment of public sector workers in response to structural adjustment measures, and environmental deterioration to shape trends and patterns of international migration.

Consequently, migration is not only growing in volume in all major sub regions, most countries do not have a single migration configuration but a whole range of types at once. Sustained past high fertility (the demographic momentum) ensures rapid increases in persons of working ages. Growing at about 2.8 per cent per year; the region requires about 7.5 million new jobs merely to stabilise the employment situation. Youth unemployment of 18.50 percent and increasingly among graduates ready to do any work, anywhere and at any wage, creates the pools of potential, destitute and desperate migrants, whose numbers are set to double within 25 years (Maharajji, 2011). The situation has since worsened as the ongoing global economic and financial crisis bites harder and deeper. It is precisely the decent work deficit that prompts the emigration of youths, seeking desperately for a more secure alternative and a future, to engage in dangerous and uncertain journeys in dare-devil ventures ‘to enter Europe. in irregular and undocumented situations In most countries, the public sector — the dominant employer — has not been able to provide viable employment opportunities to meet the demands of the rapidly-growing labour force, thus generating large numbers of unemployed youths. Mismanaged economies and human rights abuses, especially under military regimes across the sub-region, have spurred the exile of both skilled and unskilled persons (Neocosmos, 2016).

Identity and Xenophobia: Roots, Nature and Manifestations in South Africa

Tensions of identity, inclusion and exclusion have been a prominent feature of South African society for centuries with their latest expression being in the form of increasing xenophobic attitudes and actions directed at “foreign” Africans (Coplan, 2015). The most remarkable outbreak of xenophobic violence was the widespread attacks in May 2008, but more localised attacks have continued unabated since then, with attacks on Somali-owned businesses in the Gauteng townships of Diepsloot, Orange Farm and Sedibeng occurring at the time of going to press (Bauer, 2013): As during the 2008 attacks, politicians are playing down the xenophobic nature of these attacks and foregrounding criminal forces as explanatory mechanisms (Landu, 2011) Bauer (2013) points out that just as the African “foreigner” is so often portrayed as a contaminating flood, so too is the phenomenon of xenophobia, which is pathologised “as something separate from the normal, healthy South African nation” (Harris, 2002: 178), something which threatens South Africa’s image as “the Rainbow Nation”. In actuality, xenophobia cannot be separated from nationalistic technologies of nation-building (Landau, 2011).

Scholars are reporting increasing levels of xenophobia worldwide, in both developed and developing nations, coinciding with increases in asylum-seeking and soaring international migration figures (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). However, South Africa’s levels of xenophobia have been documented as being amongst the highest in the world. The precipitous rise of xenophobia in South Africa since the early 1990s was well documented prior to the May 2008 xenophobic attacks (Neocosmos, 2016), leading Crush & Ramachandran (2014: 6) to label the attacks as “the perfect storm”. The phrase “the perfect storm” highlights the complex interplay of factors contributing to those attacks, which authors have identified, *inter alia*, as the exclusionary legacies of South Africa’s apartheid past; a “siege mentality and attitudes of uniqueness and superiority towards the rest of Africa; increased porosity of borders due to corruption, resulting in increased illegal immigration; xenophobic governmental articulations and actions; rising inequality between the rich and the poor; and local processes of political opportunism accompanied by a legitimate leadership vacuum at the actual sites of violence (Coplan, 2015). Crush and Ramachandran (2009) claim that feelings of economic insecurity and relative deprivation prime such sites for the scapegoating of weaker targets. Thus, both macro-level structural, political and socio-economic processes which enable xenophobia, as

well as micro-level political processes which capitalise on or resist xenophobic impulse need to be acknowledged in any analysis of this phenomenon.

Whilst xenophobic violence typically flares up in under-resourced areas, xenophobic attitudes appear to be widespread across all sectors of South African society. Studies done by the Southern African Migration Project indicate that the only sector of South African society which displays more inclusive attitudes are the minority of people who have regular personal contact with “foreigners”. Hence, the anti-” foreigner” attitudes of most South Africans develop in a vacuum (Neocosmos,2016), unchecked by real relationships with foreign nationals, and fuelled by political rhetoric, state-sanctioned xenophobia, media reports, and the prevailing anti-” foreigner” sentiments and attitudes within their social systems.

As has been observed in the previous section of this work xenophobia can be understood to be a process of discrimination against some groups of the population based on their foreign origin or nationality. The starkly negrophobic or Afrophobic nature of much of South African xenophobia shows how racialised this phenomenon often is, and authors have noted how today’s xenophobic attitudes and actions mirror the racist exclusions that defined the past South African apartheid state (Dodson, 2017). However claiming that South African xenophobia is purely a negrophobic/Afrophobic phenomenon overlooks the fact that people of Chinese and South Asian descent (both South African “citizens” and “foreigners”) have also been victims of xenophobia, whilst “citizens” of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana have generally been spared (Landau, 2011). Thus, attempts to map South African ‘xenophobic impulses directly onto racist processes are reductive.

Blaming external agents for the social and economic ills of a country is a common political ploy Since the I 990s politicians and government institutions have been reinforcing the message that South Africa is being “invaded” by “illegal immigrants” who contribute to crime and are a drain on the country’s limited resources (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Neocosmos, 2016). Balancing notions of the economic impetus that migration often affords to a country is seldom articulated. Every time crime statistics are released which juxtapose the rounding up of “illegal immigrants” with the arrest of thieves and murderers, the message is given that the presence of undocumented migrants is directly correlated to the rising crime rate. In 2014 the minister of Home Affairs of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, announced amendments to the immigration law to streamline the processing of immigrants to South Africa who “add value to our economic, social and cultural development”. However, she made it clear that her department was “not going to be dishing out permits to illegal people” (Department of Home Affairs, 2014).

The term “illegal people” is a dangerous one; it suggests that some people (those who are assessed by the state as not being able to “add value” to South Africa’s development) have no legal basis to their humanity, and therefore, by implication, have no entitlement to human rights. The chronic abuse of “foreign” nationals by the police, the Lindela detention centre (where undocumented migrants are detained before being deported) and Home Affairs officials have been well documented (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Kriger, 2013; Crush et al, 2008). As the previous Nationalist government police force upheld the strict racial exclusions of apartheid with massively repressive tactics so the current police force continues that legacy by victimizing migrants, even in contravention of current immigration laws (Kriger, 2013). Police officers and Home Affairs officials demand bribes from migrants in return for release from detention, passports, visas and South African identity

documents, and the pervasive nature of this corruption imbues it with a sense of normality, and, therefore, rightness (Coplan, 2015).

Together with these instances of state practised, almost institutionalised, prejudice against African “foreigners”, the media has also been blamed for inflaming xenophobia. However, the media is not only an instigator but also a reflector of societal xenophobia (Nyamnjoh, 2010). Analysis of English-language newspaper coverage of cross border migration into South Africa from 1994 to 2014 has shown an encouraging shift from predominantly negative portrayals of immigrants and immigration in the 1990s, to more pro-immigration and analytical articles recently (McDonald & Jacobs, 2015). Nevertheless, media coverage remains highly polarised, with a sizeable portion of articles covering African immigration to South Africa maintaining xenophobic attitudes (McDonald & Jacobs, 2015).

Against this background of anti-” foreigner” political sentiment, abusive practices by state institutions, and mass media messages, everyday discourses in South Africa promote the perception that migrants, whose numbers have increased dramatically since 1994, are a source of competition for jobs, housing, social services, and even women (Coplan, 2015). This commodification of women reinscribes them as a material resource for men and is a graphic example of Butler’s (2003) contention that one set of abusive power vectors (in this case, patriarchy) becomes a vehicle ‘for another (xenophobia).

The peculiarity of the South African Experience of Xenophobia

Possibly the most remarkable feature of xenophobia experienced in South Africa is that it appears to have taken on a primarily racial form; it is directed at migrants, and especially black migrants, from elsewhere on the continent, as opposed to, for example, Europeans or Americans, who are, to a certain extent, practically welcomed with open arms. Xenophobia is exemplified by the fact that many of those in leadership positions are of ‘foreign’ origin, suggesting that exclusion is not simply directed against ‘foreigners’ but against those who seem to correspond to stereotypes of the stranger, especially those from Africa (Neocosmos, 2006).

One of the most striking findings of the South African Migration Programme (SAMP) survey is that, not only are Africans discriminated against, but that South African Development Community (SADC) citizens are not regarded any more favourably than Africans elsewhere on the continent. South Africans appear to believe that other SADC citizens take jobs from locals, commit crime, send their earnings out of the country, use the country’s welfare services and bring diseases (Crush & Pendleton 2004). Such xenophobia is particularly problematic, because of the historical universality of the struggle against apartheid and the unprecedented international, but mostly African, support it received in the 1980s. It is somewhat ironic that the Africans that currently face such exclusionary rhetoric hail from the same nations that harboured and nurtured the liberation struggles by providing sanctuary, education and sustenance to the fleeing comrades and cadres of the African National Congress (ANC) who are today’s gatekeepers (Nyamnjoh, 2016).

Opposition to the apartheid state served to unite, irrespective of nationality, and the identities thus constructed took on a pan-African Context. Far from harbouring feelings of resentment and hatred towards migrants from neighbouring countries, should South Africans, and particularly black citizens, not feel something nearing gratitude and possibly a sense of comradeship with them? Why is it, then, that xenophobia appears to be so deeply ingrained into South African attitudes?

According to Neocosmos (2016), the only way to make sense of this process is to acknowledge that the two defining features of the struggle — political agency and inclusiveness— were replaced by a narrowly defined citizenship of exclusiveness, one that lacked a significant active component. This

shift is part of a wider trend of political alienation in South African politics, and possibly has its origins in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which interpellated black South African citizens as victims. The fact that the Commission did not devote anything like the same amount of time and effort to an examination of the gross violations of human rights by the apartheid state on the countries of the Southern African periphery, through which a sense of solidarity could have been established between the people of the region, contributed to narrowing a conception of citizenship and ‘belonging’ to indigeneity. Arriving late into the realm of bourgeois democracy, the dominant South African view is one that sees nationhood and birthplace as coinciding. However, once more emphasising the need for education, citizenship as indigeneity suggests the reduction of citizenship to patriarchal descent within a territory, and has its origins in colonial state rule (Neocosmos, 2006).

Whitaker (2005) describes this shift in attitudes as the result of a change in the patterns of migration, suggesting that refugees are no longer perceived as victims of conflict but instead as active participants. This is certainly supported by the perceptions endorsed in the mass media; there seems to be no trace of sympathy or even empathy towards the current crop of immigrants, which may be due to their association with crime, the perceived economic disadvantages that accompany them or, indeed, because they are seen as simply undeserving of South African citizenship because they originate from a ‘failed state’. There is little, if any, sense of comradeship with their former allies; as the head of the Human Rights Commission, Jody Kollapen, intimated, “There is an increasing feeling that while we appreciate what they (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and Zambia) had done, we cannot remain eternally obliged” (Independent Online 2007).

Unlike many countries, South Africa has an urban-based refugee population, which means that access to basic services, such as housing, sanitation and water, are provided in the same way as they are provided to South African citizens, rather than specific service delivery to refugees, as there would be in a camp-based situation (Palmary 2004). Due, to the severe problems experienced with service delivery, this places an extra strain on local government and calls for better training in regard to refugees and their rights, so that this information can be disseminated to the local community.

A final peculiarity of South African xenophobia, and one that is of some concern, is that there does not appear to be a ‘xenophobe profile’: no specific group or groups alone within society are culpable of xenophobia. The fact that negative attitudes are so pervasive and widespread against the traditional argument that only certain types of people are xenophobic and creates a massive public education challenge, of not only knowing whom to target but also of simply where to begin (Crush & Pendleton 2004). It also suggests that the reasoning behind xenophobia (although by its very nature, xenophobia is irrational) is not based solely on economic grounds, as it is found across all socio-economic groups.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Xenophobia, though a worldwide phenomenon, continues to plague African countries with developing economies and South Africa, with its economic hardships and immigration issues, is constantly faced with violent xenophobic attacks on immigrants. Xenophobic occurrences in South Africa and Africa in general, are more or less similar to those in the rest of the world. Xenophobic assaults on foreign nationals in South Africa is said to have come from the defunct apartheid regime of South Africa. Xenophobic inclinations towards foreign nationals in South Africa also explain the fact that the former repressive regime practices are gravely embedded into the country’s system and such development is not ideal for socio development and nation-building. The long years of isolation from the rest of the

world was a practice of the former regime as seen manifested in the strained relationship between black South Africans and foreign nationals under the umbrella of xenophobic' sentiments. South Africa, born from the ashes of apartheid, was granted democratic dispensation in 1994, which was greeted with much euphoria. However, some black South Africans developed a phobia or hatred, mistrust, and suspicions toward foreign nationals who were perceived as people 'reaping from where they did not sow' (Crush et al, 2008, pp.3 1-32, Dodson, 2010, pp.8-9, Neocosmos, 200, pp.29-31). The same sluggish manner, in which the South African government responded in the face of the xenophobic outbreak, was the same way the judiciary responded in bringing to book perpetrators of the xenophobic violence, which witnessed 62 deaths of foreign nationals including South Africans (Klaaren, 2010, p.1 35). Thus, Matsinhe (2011, pp.296-31 0) and Roemer et al. (2007, p.244) argued that the culture of violence finds 'politics of exclusion' is a by-product of the defunct Apartheid regime, which is embedded in the country's system.

Several studies on xenophobia have been conducted over the years; however, the recurrent sparks of xenophobic attacks in Africa suggest that much still needs to be done to resolve the underlying triggering factors that lead to these violent attacks on black African foreigners residing in the continent there is need to look at the nature and the causes of xenophobia in Africa, the impact of xenophobia on foreign nationals living in the continent and most importantly, the diplomatic implications involved. The purpose is to understand the reasons for the attitudes and practices of xenophobia in the country and to highlight the magnitude of negative effects that xenophobia can have on the diplomatic relationship between African states and the rest of the world.

This paper recommends that the following be done o manage the xenophobic manifestations that often accompany migration and identity in Africa.

- 1 Governments and Political Leaders should acknowledge and condemn acts of bias-motivated violence whenever they occur by sending immediate, strong, public, and consistent messages that bias-motivated violence—including against refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, displaced persons, and. Migrants will be investigated thoroughly and prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
- 2 Government should strengthen enforcement and prosecute offenders by ensuring that those responsible for acts of bias-motivated violence are held accountable under the law and that the prosecution of such acts against any individuals, regardless of their legal status in the country, is a priority for the criminal justice system;
- 3 Government should monitor and report bias-motivated violence, including against migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless and internally displaced persons, by maintaining official systems of monitoring and public reporting to provide accurate data for informed policy decisions to combat such violence;
- 4 Government should reach out to affected communities by conducting outreach and education efforts to communities and civil society groups-including those consisting of or working with migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless and internally displaced persons — in order to 1) reduce fear and assist victims, 2) advance police-community relations, 3) encourage improved reporting of acts of bias-motivated violence to. the police, 4) protect victims who are undocumented from being deported following their decision to report incidents to the authorities, and 5) improve the quality of data collection by law enforcement bodies; and

- 5 Civil society organisations should develop mechanisms to monitor, record, and publicly report on incidents of xenophobic violence as a means of addressing current levels of underreporting and encouraging improved reporting by states;
- 6 Civil society should report progress or shortcomings on State efforts to combat xenophobic and other bias-motivated violence to international mechanisms such as the Human Rights Committee, CERD, anti-Human Rights

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