Article

Multi-National Joint Taskforce and the Fight Against Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria, 2009-2020

Nwiue Festus Menele Appollos[1*]

1. Department of Political Science, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
* Correspondence: festusnwiue@gmail.com

Abstract: Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group in North-Eastern Nigeria, has perpetuated violence since 2009, leading to immense suffering and drawing global condemnation. This study examined the role of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in combating Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin from 2009–2020, addressing the knowledge gap in understanding the application of collective security doctrines. Guided by Organski's collective security theory and using a descriptive survey design, data were collected from 450 respondents in Adamawa, Borno, Taraba, and Yobe states through questionnaires, interviews, and secondary sources. Analysis revealed that MNJTF operations significantly curtailed Boko Haram activities but were hindered by corruption. The study recommends anti-corruption training for military leaders to enhance operational effectiveness, emphasizing the importance of accountability in counterterrorism.

Keywords: Multi-National Joint Taskforce, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Corruption

1. Introduction

Today's world faces a troubling rise in violent crimes, affecting numerous countries and posing a serious concern to the global community. At the forefront of these crimes is terrorism, which has escalated globally over the past decade in various forms, both domestic and international. International terrorism involves the calculated use or threat of violence to incite fear, intending to coerce or intimidate governments or societies for political, religious, or ideological purposes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020). This form of violence is an illegitimate use of force that endangers innocent civilians and is a major threat to global peace and security, keeping it a top priority for policy and intelligence agencies.

In Africa, terrorism has roots that can be traced to anti-colonial struggles, and recent terrorist incidents reveal the severity of threats, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Although transnational terrorism draws considerable attention due to its dramatic impacts, its causes often link back to local grievances or issues (Woldemicheal, 2006). Since independence, Africa has seen widespread civil conflicts and internal unrest. Some of these conflicts have evolved into prolonged, destructive wars driven by seemingly irreconcilable goals. Leaders often see these as zero-sum situations, with some parties benefiting more from ongoing conflict than from peace (Crocker et al., 2005). Somalia in the Horn of Africa exemplifies this "intractable" conflict, while the broader West African region has long experienced instability and conflict, predating the emergence of groups like Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria.

West Africa's stability and security challenges trace back to the 1960s. Conflicts have included the civil wars in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, as well as the Niger Delta insurgency, the Malian Tuareg rebellions, and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, which continues today. Most of these conflicts are intra-state in nature, destabilizing both local and regional security dynamics.

Boko Haram's violent activities in northeastern Nigeria have impacted not only Nigeria but also neighboring countries in the Lake Chad Basin, including Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, which are vulnerable to this insurgency. Boko Haram has used these areas as hideouts and recruitment grounds (Voice of America News, 2016). This militant group has severely threatened Nigeria's cohesion and stability, extending its influence to Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger. Boko Haram's evolution has damaged Nigeria's reputation as the "Giant of Africa," creating fears of an impending civil war due to their continuous and brutal terrorist attacks, which have led to significant loss of life and widespread fear. Founded by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram opposes Western education, culture, and modern science. Yusuf warned of prolonged conflict if political and educational systems remain unchanged (Sergie & Johnson, 2015).

Boko Haram has increasingly evolved into a transnational terrorist movement, with its activities permeating both Nigerian society and surrounding regions. This growing threat has raised concerns across West African governments. For instance, in 2012, Chadian President Idriss Déby warned that Boko Haram could terrorize the entire Lake Chad Basin if not controlled. Such apprehensions spurred the creation of a joint military coalition to combat the insurgency (Goyei, 2018).

Cross-border security has long been a concern for Lake Chad Basin countries, but significant military cooperation only took shape in the early 2010s, following Boko Haram's 2009 uprising. The insurgency's threat to Nigeria and neighboring Lake Chad countries prompted the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states to activate the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which addresses cross-border security and counter-terrorism. Boko Haram's attacks have disrupted local communities, displaced populations, and created urgent humanitarian needs (Sambe, 2016). A 2014 Paris summit further bolstered regional cooperation through intelligence sharing, coordinated patrols, and border surveillance (Zamfir, 2015).

The MNJTF, operating under African Union (AU) political leadership, was founded by LCBC member states—Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, along with Benin. Originally headquartered in Baga, Nigeria, it moved to N'Djamena, Chad, following a Boko Haram assault in 2015. The LCBC, though not directly involved in peace operations, serves as the primary political coordination body for MNJTF efforts.

Since its formation in 1994 to combat cross-border crime and terrorism, the MNJTF has expanded its scope to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin, launching various task forces from 2015 to 2018 (Yusuf, 2018). However, the coalition has faced challenges, including Nigeria's initial reluctance to share operational control, historical territorial tensions with Chad and Cameroon, and issues with corruption and inadequate military supplies affecting troop morale (Kumar, 2020). In 2015, delays in Nigerian deployment led to frustrations among coalition members, with Chadian President Déby noting Nigerian troops' delays in reinforcing reclaimed areas (Siegle, 2013).

This study aims to examine how the collective security efforts by Lake Chad Basin countries have shaped the formation and operations of the MNJTF in response to the regional security threat posed by Boko Haram.

Statement of the Problem

The Boko Haram sect has posed a critical security challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa, as feared by the Chadian President. This group employs various methods of political

violence—including hijacking, kidnapping, and bombing—primarily targeting civilians, which places substantial pressure on state stability. What began as a perceived domestic issue within Nigeria soon expanded into a broader regional concern (Weeraratne, 2015). As Oyewole (2015, p.428) noted, Boko Haram has "emerged as one of the greatest threats to human security in Africa, especially in the Lake Chad region." The effects of Boko Haram's activities have crossed Nigeria's borders, impacting neighboring countries like Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, where the group's operations have gradually expanded (Marc et al., 2015). These ongoing attacks have led to kidnapping, displacement, and fatalities among citizens in neighboring countries, such as Cameroon.

The severity of these threats has prompted Sub-Saharan African governments to form a military alliance, establishing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to intensify efforts against terrorism and eliminate Boko Haram. Initially, the MNJTF's mandate was to conduct military operations in the Lake Chad region, curb banditry, and facilitate free movement across the borders of Lake Chad Basin Commission members. However, Boko Haram's activities in Baga, a strategic hub for arms procurement, attack planning, and reception of foreign fighters, necessitated an expansion of the MNJTF's mandate in April 2012 to include counter-terrorism efforts. While some scholars argue that the MNJTF has effectively enhanced collective security in the Lake Chad Basin, others, such as Eji (2016) and Obamamoye (2019), contend that it has not fully achieved this goal. This study, therefore, examines the MNJTF's role in combating Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin from 2009 to 2020.

Research Questions

This study seeks to provide answers to the following research questions:

1. How does the fight against Boko Haram by the MNJTF's guide the doctrines of collective security in North-East, Nigeria?
2. To what extent does the operational strategies of the MNJTF curtail the expansion of Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria?
3. How does corruption among the military high command in Nigeria hinder the efforts of the MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria?

Objectives of the Study

The primary aim of the research is to analyse the impact of international alliances, specifically collective security formations, on state attempts to tackle regional security threats and difficulties, use the establishment of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin as a case study. However, the specific objectives of the study are to:

1. examine whether the MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram were guided by the doctrines of collective security in North-East, Nigeria;
2. determine whether the operational strategies of the MNJTF help curtail the expansion of Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria
3. ascertain whether corruption among the military high command in Nigeria hinder the efforts of the MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria

Theoretical Framework

This research is based on the Collective Security idea, first formulated by Organski (1958) and subsequently advanced by authors like Bennett (1988) and Kissinger (1992). Collective Security denotes a security framework in which governments collaborate to safeguard the security of all members by undertaking collective measures against any member state that jeopardises the existing order via the use of force. This security strategy constitutes an exception to the norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of

sovereign governments. Collective Security fosters amicable relations and equality among member nations while upholding the sovereignty of each state, protecting them against political or economic exploitation and domination by others.

The term, while historically established, acquired more importance post-Cold War in the 1980s, when the notion of security broadened to include socio-economic, political, environmental, and gender dimensions in addition to military considerations. Collective Security serves as an instrument of international policy designed to deter arbitrary or aggressive force, functioning as a constraint on military action rather than just implementing all facets of international law. The idea asserts that governments respond to moral pleas over the abuse of power, therefore fostering a logical strategy for sustaining peace. This methodical strategy employs diplomatic, economic, and military penalties to incentivise prospective aggressors to make choices that correspond with national self-interest and avert "threatened damage."

Collective Security operates as a modern strategy for crisis management. The global community is expected to unite to prevent war and aggression, using the principles of Collective Security to achieve this goal. The concept underlies regional security frameworks and has been widely used to maintain international peace and security via peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace support, and sometimes, peace enforcement operations.

The idea of Collective Security is based on many key principles or assumptions. Bennett (1988), cited in Zagga et al. (2017), contends that the concept is based on the assumption that all nations have a mutual interest in preserving peace. Bennett (1988, p.23) said that for collective security to operate effectively, peace must be seen as indivisible, and threats to peace in any region must be considered the collective responsibility of all members of the international system. Furthermore, all members must agree in advance to react promptly and effectively to threats to peace and must be organised to implement procedures for collective action against such threats, even if the response targets members with whom they have cordial ties.

The aggressor nation will face overwhelming opposition from the other system members, leading to the rapid reinstatement of peace. The possibility of substantial opposition often dissuades nascent aggressors from their inclination to breach international peace. A collective security system entails the centralisation of a society's coercive apparatus. As a result, the members of that society, in this case States, forfeit a considerable amount of their individual freedoms to pursue self-help and are often limited to a constrained right of self-defence, usually until the central authority takes charge of their protection.

Organski (1960) has clearly outlined these fundamental qualities, enumerating five essential assumptions that underpin the notion of collective security. The subsequent five fundamental assumptions underpinning the idea of collective security, as delineated by Organski, are as follows.

1. In an armed conflict, Member Nation States will reach a consensus on the identity of the aggressor.
2. All Member Nation States are equally dedicated to containing and constraining aggression, regardless of its source or origin.
3. All Member Nation States possess equivalent freedom of action and capacity to participate in actions against the aggressor.
4. The collective strength of the cooperating alliance members for collective security will be sufficient to surpass the power of the aggressor.
5. In response to the danger presented by the combined might of a Collective Security alliance, the aggressor country will alter its policies, or if it refuses, will face defeat.

Kissinger (1992) observed that collective security requires each state to take responsibility for the security of all others. He argued that this concept "assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it" (Kissinger, 1992). In this framework, the insecurity of one state makes all states less secure; for example, a regional issue like the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria affects neighboring countries. Local disputes or economic and ethnic conflicts can cross borders, underscoring the need for states to take united action against any aggressor, acting as one.

Joint force is fundamental to the theory of collective security, rooted in the idealist view of an international community where states cooperate to address shared issues. This idealistic vision aims to replace an anarchic international system lacking central enforcement with one based on collective security (Kant, 1957). Collective security merges diplomacy with coercion to maintain peace, and in extreme cases, it advocates for the use of force if diplomatic efforts fail. This was seen in the United Nations' actions in Korea (1950), Congo (1960), and Iraq (1990).

The primary goal is to establish the concept of indivisible peace and to encourage governments and citizens alike to uphold it. This principle echoes the sentiment "one for all, and all for one" (Morgenthau), as peace is interconnected; a threat in one area can spiral into global turmoil. Collective security assumes that governments and citizens will recognize that human society is so closely connected that a breach in one place threatens stability everywhere. Unaddressed aggression in one region can empower aggressors to expand, while unchecked lawless force in one context erodes respect for order universally. The remoteness of aggression is irrelevant. This is exemplified by the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, when he switched from sighing, in the fall of 1938:

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here, because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people we know nothing," to asserting, one year later, that "If, in spite of all we find ourselves forced to embark on a struggle ... we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far-away city in a foreign land; we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles, the destruction of which would involve the destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the world.

Collective security fundamentally rejects the isolationist notion that wars can or should be localized. As Alfred Nemours, Haiti's representative in the League of Nations, warned during the Italian aggression against Ethiopia: "Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or colored, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody's Ethiopia" (Nwokah, 2022, p.216). This highlights the global interconnectedness in the face of conflict. Africa, like many parts of the world, faces challenges to sustainable peace, with internal conflicts often fueled by organized crime, terrorism, and privatized violence. Social disparities, limited opportunities for youth, and the proliferation of small arms create conditions ripe for extremism. These complex, cross-border threats necessitate coordinated responses at regional, continental, and global levels.

Organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking, further undermines state stability, illustrating the necessity for collective security. Individual nations often lack the capacity to address such threats independently, requiring cooperation to establish comprehensive security arrangements. Across continents, regional security frameworks support the collective international security system, working to prevent the use of force among members and address threats like terrorism.

The theory of collective security is directly applicable in countering the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's northeast. As Joshi (2018) notes, a collective approach is more effective than isolated efforts. Combating Boko Haram demands a unified strategy encompassing diplomatic, economic, and military collaboration among states and the

international community. The UN, for instance, passed Resolution 2122 in 2013, condemning Boko Haram's actions and advocating for coordinated countermeasures.

The African Union has also actively addressed Boko Haram, launching the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2014 with forces from Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. The task force has reclaimed significant territories from Boko Haram's control (Geschiere, 2015). Civil society has further contributed, with initiatives like the AU's Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, addressing specific needs of those affected by the insurgency, particularly women and girls (African Union, 2017). Additionally, Nigeria's Victims Support Fund provides essential support for those impacted by the violence (Nigerian Government, 2018).

In summary, the theory of collective security offers a crucial framework for evaluating the collaborative efforts against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. Through the combined efforts of the international community, regional bodies, and civil society, meaningful progress has been made in countering the threat posed by Boko Haram, contributing to greater stability in the region.

2. Materials and Methods

The paper adopted a descriptive survey design to analyze collective security efforts against Boko Haram in Nigeria's Lake Chad Basin. The descriptive survey design, which captures the current state of a population, employed various methods like surveys, interviews, and observations. The study's population includes the residents of Adamawa, Borno, Taraba, and Yobe States, totaling a projected population of 16,469,607. A sample size of 400 respondents, selected through purposive sampling, provided insights into security measures and the impact of insurgency on local communities.

Primary data collection methods included a self-structured questionnaire, personal interviews, and focus groups, while secondary data sources involved analysis of institutional reports and official documents. Additionally, photographic materials documented on-the-ground efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against insurgents. Data analysis included statistical methods for primary data and content analysis for secondary sources, allowing assessment of the MNJTF's effectiveness. This methodological approach aimed to offer comprehensive insights into the Boko Haram insurgency's impact and inform future policies to strengthen security in the region.

Data Presentation

Table 1. Questionnaire Distribution and Return Rate

	Distributed	Retrieved	Rejected
Frequency	400	376	24
Percentage	100	94	6

Source: Fieldwork Survey (2023)

The table above present the rate of questionnaire distributed and the rate retrieved from the field. According to the analysis, 400(100%) were distributed, 376 representing (94%) were retrieved while 24 representing (6%) were rejected.

Analysis of Research Questions

Research Question 1: How does the fight against Boko Haram by the MNJTF's guided by the doctrines of collective security in North-East, Nigeria?

Table 2. The fight against Boko Haram by the MNJTF and the doctrines of collective security in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	Item	SA	A	SD	D	Mean	Std.	Decision
1.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was guided by the doctrines of collective security in North-East, Nigeria.	90	202	76	8	2..99	0.72	**Accepted**
2.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was effective in achieving the goals of collective security in North-East, Nigeria.	96	183	78	19	2.94	0.81	**Accepted**
3.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was based on the principles of collective security in North-East, Nigeria.	97	193	78	8	3.00	0.74	**Accepted**
4.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was guided by the international standards for collective security in North-East, Nigeria.	140	189	43	4	3.23	0.68	**Accepted**
5.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was conducted in accordance with the principles of collective security in North-East, Nigeria.	74	167	95	40	2.73	0.89	**Accepted**
6.	The MNJTF's fight against Boko Haram was effective in protecting the people of North-East, Nigeria from the threat of Boko Haram.	119	198	52	7	3.14	0.71	**Accepted**
7.	Do you think that the collective security system of the MNJTF is beneficial in preventing the spread of Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria?	109	198	57	12	3.07	0.75	**Accepted**
	Grand Total					**3.01**	**0.75**	**Accepted**

Source: Fieldwork Survey, 2024

Table 2 above was used to analyse how the MNJTF's efforts against Boko Haram are informed by the principles of collective security in North-East Nigeria. The objective was to ascertain if the campaign against Boko Haram is being executed in accordance with the theory of collective security in the North-East area. The overall mean of 3.01 and a standard deviation of 0.75 indicated that the respondents agreed that the MNJTF's efforts against Boko Haram were informed by the principles of collective security in North-East Nigeria.

Research Question 2: How does the operational strategies of the MNJTF curtail the expansion of Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria?

Table 3. The operational strategies of the MNJTF and the expansion of Boko Haram terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	Item	SA	A	SD	D	Mean	Std.	Decision
8.	The MNJTF has been effective in containing the spread of Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria	86	200	81	9	2.96	0.73	**Accepted**
9.	The MNJTF has been successful in eliminating the threat posed by Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria:	81	188	85	22	2.87	0.81	**Accepted**
10.	The MNJTF has been able to reduce the security risks associated with Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria	145	167	57	7	3.19	0.75	**Accepted**
11.	The MNJTF has been able to create a safe environment for the people in North-East, Nigeria	113	201	56	6	3.11	0.70	**Accepted**
12.	The MNJTF has been able to create a safe environment for the people in North-East, Nigeria:	121	177	69	9	3.09	0.77	**Accepted**
13.	The MNJTF strategies have been effective in curtailing the expansion of Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria:	59	273	39	5	3.02	0.56	**Accepted**
14.	The MNJTF strategies have been successful in reducing the number of attacks by Boko Haram Terrorists in North-East, Nigeria:	151	190	34	1	3.30	0.64	**Accepted**
15.	The MNJTF strategies are the most effective way to counter the Boko Haram Terrorist activities in North-East, Nigeria:	142	173	55	6	3.19	0.74	**Accepted**
	Grand Total					**3.09**	**0.71**	**Accepted**

Source: Fieldwork Survey, 2024

Table 3 above was used to analyse the respondents' reactions to research question 2. The objective of the investigation was to determine how the operational techniques of the MNJTF mitigate the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist operations in North-East Nigeria. The overall mean of 3.09 and a standard deviation of 0.71 indicate that most respondents feel the operational techniques of the MNJTF have effectively mitigated the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist operations in North-East Nigeria.

Research Question 3: How does corruption among the military high command in Nigeria hinder the efforts of the MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria?

Table 4. How corruption among the military high command in Nigeria hinder the efforts of the MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	Item	SA	A	SD	D	Mean	Std.	Decision
17.	Do you think corruption among the military high command in Nigeria has hampered the efforts of the MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria	120	190	63	3	3.13	0.70	**Accepted**
18.	Is the military high command's corruption a major obstacle to the success of the MNJTF in defeating Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria	155	158	57	6	3.22	0.75	**Accepted**
19.	The military high command's corrupt activities have a negative effect on the ability of the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria	90	202	76	8	2.99	0.72	**Accepted**
20.	Military high command's corruption caused problems for the MNJTF in their efforts to defeat Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria	103	192	67	14	3.02	0.77	**Accepted**
21.	Military high command's corruption have an impact on the efforts of the MNJTF to defeat Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria?	137	216	-	23	3.30	0.57	**Accepted**
22.	Military high command's corruption a major factor in the failure of the MNJTF to successfully contain Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria?	118	196	52	10	3.12	0.73	**Accepted**
	Grand Total					**3.13**	**0.70**	**Accepted**

Source: Fieldwork Survey, 2024

Table 4 above was used to analyse the respondents' perspectives about research question 3 of the study. The research sought to determine how corruption inside the

military high command in Nigeria obstructed the MNJTF's attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorist organisation in North-East Nigeria. The mean ratio of 3.13 and standard deviation of 0.70 indicated that the majority of respondents believe that corruption within the military high command in Nigeria has impeded the MNJTF's attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorist organisation in North-East Nigeria.

3. Results and Discussion

The Fight against Boko Haram by the MNJTF and the Doctrines of Collective Security in North-East, Nigeria

Table 2 of the study was used to evaluate research question 1, articulated as follows: How does the MNJTF's engagement against Boko Haram, informed by the principles of collective security, manifest in North-East Nigeria? The research sought to determine if the campaign against Boko Haram is being executed on the ideology of collective security in the Northeast area. The overall mean of 3.01 and a Standard Deviation of 0.75 indicated that the respondents agreed that the MNJTF's efforts against Boko Haram were informed by the principles of collective security in North-East Nigeria. The conflict with Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria has been a sensitive matter for several years. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has been at the forefront, conducting direct combat operations against the insurgent organisation. Although the MNJTF has achieved some success in restraining the terrorist organisation, the use of collective security theories might augment the MNJTF's initiatives.

Collective security doctrines are based on the assumption that all member states of an alliance have a common interest in maintaining peace and security, and that any threat to the security of one member state is a threat to all (Lutz, 2017). To confirm this, one of the participants who is 39 years old secondary school teacher revealed this:

The concept of collective security has been increasingly utilized to combat the terrorist group Boko Haram in the North-East of Nigeria. This type of security emphasizes a unified effort within the international community in order to prevent, respond to, and ultimately stop the terrorist group from furthering their agenda in the region (Interview with Participant 003 on 12/08/2022).

The collective security approach adopted by ECOWAS sub-region in the fight against Boko Haram has been the subject of several empirical studies. These studies provide important insights into the effectiveness of this approach, as well as potential areas for improvement. For instance, a study conducted by Thaon et al. (2019) found that the adoption of collective security was effective in creating a multi-faceted approach to tackling the Boko Haram insurgency. The researchers argued that collective security was effective in not only addressing the immediate security threats posed by Boko Haram, but also in facilitating a long-term, sustainable resolution to the conflict. The authors noted that the collaboration of multiple stakeholders, including the Nigerian government and the international community, was effective in creating a more comprehensive response to the conflict. One of the respondents aptly observed that Ecowas has contributed immensely to the security of the region. Some of the ways are stated thus:

The MNJTF is an example of collective security in action, as it was formed in 1994 as a joint military task force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to protect the collective security of its members. The MNJTF has been effective in containing Boko Haram, partly due to its collective security approach. The MNJTF has achieved success by pooling resources and personnel from member states, as well as coordinating cross-border military operations (Interview with Participant 007 0n 13/08/2022)

72 years old retired Army General offered his own view of the concept of collective when asked the meaning of the concepts. He defined collective security as follows:

Collective security is a system of international relations in which states agree to work together to prevent and respond to threats to international peace and security. It is based

on the idea that the security of one state is linked to the security of all other states, and that all states should work together to prevent and respond to threats.

When asked the extent to which collective security doctrine was employed in tackling the problem in the region, he has this to say:

The doctrine of collective security is not being practiced in the North-East Nigeria to a great extent. The region is facing a number of security challenges, including the Boko Haram insurgency, which has caused significant displacement and disruption to the lives of many people. The Nigerian government has taken some steps to address the security situation, such as deploying the military to the region, but the security situation remains fragile and the doctrine of collective security has not been fully implemented.

Some studies conducted in the region revealed that the collective security doctrine, which calls for collective action taken by states to prevent or respond to aggression, has been largely unsuccessful in the fight against Boko Haram in the north-east of Nigeria. As discovered by Kugelman and O'Brien (2015), it is because the states of the region have not been able to coordinate their efforts to establish an effective security system.

As a result, Boko Haram has been able to exploit local divisions and operate with relative impunity. Furthermore, the collective security doctrine has been further hindered by the lack of political will of the Nigerian government to address the crisis, as well as its reluctance to accept international assistance. As Kugelman and O'Brien (2015) point out, "Nigeria has consistently rejected international assistance in the fight against Boko Haram, seeing it as a challenge to its sovereignty". This has made it difficult for regional states to cooperate and coordinate their efforts to address the threat posed by Boko Haram.

The scholars who agreed that the collective security approach has failed argued that the causes of the failure of the doctrine of collective security were political instability, weak military and security forces, lack of political will, corruption and poor economic conditions. Oluwole (2017) in their study on causes of failure of the collective security doctrine in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria also discuss the role of external actors such as the United States and the United Kingdom in the conflict.

In attempt to point out the factors that led to the failure of the doctrine of collective security in the region, one of the participant aptly noted that the lack of political will from the member states of the collective security system to take collective action against threats to regional security has been a major factor in the failure of the doctrine. He further noted as follows:

The collective security system is based on the principle that all member states will work together to protect regional security. However, in practice, this has not always been the case. Member states have often been reluctant to take collective action against threats to regional security, due to their own political interests or the desire to maintain their sovereignty. This lack of political will has been a major factor in the failure of the doctrine, as it has prevented collective action from being taken to address a threat.

On the other hand, a study conducted by Okumu (2015) found that the doctrine of collective security was effective in creating a more robust response to the Boko Haram insurgency. He also argued that the combination of military and non-military approaches to the insurgency was effective in providing a more effective response to the conflict. In particular, Okumu (2015) noted that the collaboration of the Nigerian government and the international community was essential in creating a more comprehensive response to the conflict, which included the implementation of development strategies, such as poverty reduction, education and health initiatives.

The Operational Strategies of the MNJTF to Curtail the Expansion of Boko Haram Terrorist Activities in North-East, Nigeria

Table 3 was used to analyse the respondents' answers to research question 2, which enquired: How do the operational methods of the MNJTF mitigate the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist operations in North-East Nigeria? The investigation sought to

determine how the operational techniques of the MNJTF contribute to limiting the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist operations in North-East Nigeria. The overall mean of 3.09 and a standard deviation of 0.71 indicate that most respondents feel the operational techniques of the MNJTF have effectively mitigated the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist operations in North-East Nigeria.

To corroborate the above, 55 years old Ahmed Abdullahi noted as follows:

The Nigerian Army has implemented multiple strategies to help curb the spread of Boko Haram in the North East of Nigeria. These strategies include increasing the number of troops in the region, conducting regular patrols and raids, and engaging in joint operations with other security forces. Additionally, the Nigerian Army has sought to cut off the group's access to resources, including funds and weaponry, as well as increasing intelligence gathering activities to help identify and disrupt potential terrorist activity. Finally, the Nigerian Army has worked to build relationships with local communities in order to gain support for its operations and to help identify potential threats (Interview with Participant 011 on 18/12/2022)

The finding revealed that MNJTF has had a significant impact in curtailing the expansion of Boko Haram in the North-East of Nigeria. Since the start of their operations in 2013, the MNJTF operations has managed to reclaim large swathes of territory that had been previously occupied by Boko Haram militants, and has successfully pushed them out of major cities in the region. to argue further, a 50 years old lecturer explained this:

Military operations have had a significant impact on curtailing the expansion of Boko Haram in the North-East Nigeria. The Nigerian military has conducted numerous operations against the group, including airstrikes, ground assaults, and intelligence-led operations. These operations have resulted in the capture or killing of many of the group's leaders, as well as the disruption of their supply lines and the destruction of their camps.

Similarly, a study conducted by Peters (2015) found that the deployment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2014 had a significant impact on reducing the threat of Boko Haram in the region. The MNJTF was made up of a combination of troops from Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, and included air and land forces that were able to successfully combat Boko Haram. For example, the MNJTF was able to disrupt a Boko Haram offensive in the city of Damasak, Niger and pushed them out of the city.

Similarly, Nwachukwu (2016) conducted a study on the effectiveness of the Nigerian military operations in North-East Nigeria and concluded that the efforts of the Nigerian military were successful in containing the spread of Boko Haram and restoring stability to the region. The study found that Nigerian troops were highly effective in engaging in counter-insurgency operations that targeted both Boko Haram militants and their logistical support networks. Furthermore, the study pointed out that the Nigerian military had provided critical support to the MNJTF in the form of air and land operations that had been successful in weakening the insurgency.

The Impact of Corruption among the Military High Command in Nigeria on the Efforts of the MNJTF in Tackling the Boko Haram Armed Terrorist Group in North-East Nigeria

Table 4 was used to convey the respondents' perspectives on study question 3, which states: In what ways does corruption within Nigeria's military high command impede the MNJTF's attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorist organisation in North-East Nigeria? The research sought to determine how corruption inside Nigeria's military high command impeded the MNJTF's attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorist organisation in North-East Nigeria. The mean ratio of 3.13 and standard deviation of 0.70 indicated that the majority of respondents believe that corruption within the military high command in Nigeria has obstructed the MNJTF's attempts to combat the Boko Haram terrorist organisation in North-East Nigeria. To substantiate this, one of the primary informants said as follows:

The level of corruption in the Nigerian army is high. In the Nigerian Army, funds meant for the prosecution of the war between the terrorist and army were being misappropriated by the high-ranking officers. Fraudulent contracts are also a form of corruption in the Nigerian Army. This involves awarding contracts to companies or individuals that are not qualified to do the job. This is done to gain personal gain or to benefit those who are close to the senior officer who is awarding the contract. (Interview with Participant 008 on 18/12/2022)

One of the participants who gave his name as Mr. Sunny, a 45 year old civil servant indicated as follows:

Yes, corruption is present in the Nigerian army. Corruption in the military can take many forms, such as bribery, embezzlement, and nepotism. Additionally, corruption can lead to a lack of accountability and transparency, which can undermine the effectiveness of the military in responding to security threats. The Nigerian government has taken steps to address corruption in the military, such as introducing anti-corruption measures and strengthening oversight mechanisms (interview conducted on 06/02/2023).

Another respondent argued that corruption has badly affected the aim of the military in the fight against the terrorist. This is what he has to say:

The impact of corruption in the fight against Boko Haram is significant. Corruption can lead to a lack of accountability and transparency, which can undermine the effectiveness of the military in responding to security threats. Additionally, corruption can lead to the misappropriation of funds and resources, which can limit the ability of the military to provide humanitarian assistance and other services to those affected by the conflict (interview conducted on 06/02/2023).

A study by Adebayo (2020) found that the corruption among the military high command has hindered the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in tackling the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East, Nigeria. The study found that the high command has been using MNJTF funds for personal benefit, which has resulted in operational inefficiencies, increased costs and delays in responding to the threat posed by Boko Haram (Adebayo, 2020). Another respondent argued that army officers were found wanting in money laundry cases. One of such is the case in 2019, where a Nigerian Army Colonel was arrested for allegedly laundering $1.5 million. He further explained some of the cases as follows:

For instance, in 2018, a Nigerian Army Lieutenant-General was also arrested and charged with receiving bribes from contractors. In 2019 also, a retired Nigerian Army Major General was indicted for allegedly misappropriating over N400 million ($1.1 million). In the past years in 2017, a Nigerian Army Colonel was arrested for allegedly using fake documents to secure contracts. In 2016, a Nigerian Army General was accused of using his position to award contracts to his family and friends without due process. (Interview with Participant 009 on 18/12/2022)

One of the respondents also argued that the rate of corruption in the army is very high and that was why they were unable to prosecute the war effective. He explained thus: The government came with the mantra to of change from the highly corrupt Nigeria to a less corruption ridden country. But reverse is the case in Nigeria today. The Nigerian Army under Muhammadu Buhari has been plagued by a lack of accountability when it comes to the provision of equipment for its troops. Despite the government's promises to provide the necessary resources, the Nigerian Army has often been short on the necessary supplies it needs to operate effectively. (Interview with Participant 010 on 18/12/2022).

This is further compounded by poor financial oversight and accountability, as well as a lack of transparency in the procurement process, which has enabled military commanders to manipulate the system and divert resources away from MNJTF operations (Adebayo, 2020). The study concluded that the prevalence of corruption among the military high command has undermined the MNJTF's ability to effectively counter the

threat of Boko Haram, and that greater transparency and accountability must be established in order to ensure the successful completion of its mission (Adebayo, 2020).

Furthermore, the study conducted by Adejoh and Omonona (2015) revealed that corruption is a major obstacle to the success of the counter-terrorism campaign in Nigeria's North-East Region. The authors argue that corruption undermines the security sector reform initiatives and distorts the relationship between the government and the people in the region, leading to a lack of trust in the government. They found that corruption has been facilitated by the lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability in the public sector, as well as a lack of resources and capacity in the security sector.

The findings of Adekunle and Bello (2018) also supported the finding in this study when they concluded that corruption has had a significant effect on the efficacy of counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria. Specifically, the authors found that corruption has hampered the Nigerian government's ability to fund and implement counter-terrorism initiatives, and has limited the effectiveness of the security forces in combating the insurgency. Furthermore, the study concluded that corruption has created an environment of impunity within the security forces, enabling members of Boko Haram to operate with impunity.

It is no gainsaying to say that corruption in the Nigerian Army has been a major concern in recent years, with reports of bribery and embezzlement emerging from within its ranks. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and the military is no exception (Transparency International, 2019). The Nigerian Army has been accused of involvement in bribery, mismanagement of funds, and misuse of resources, to name a few (Nkem, 2018). In a recent incident, four officers in the Nigerian Army were arrested for allegedly receiving bribes and misusing their positions to influence the outcome of a court-martial (The Guardian, 2018). The officers were accused of receiving over $100,000 from the families of the accused, in exchange for a favourable outcome.

In another incident, a Major-General in the Nigerian Army was arrested for allegedly receiving bribes from contractors in exchange for government contracts (Vanguard, 2019). The Major-General was accused of receiving over $250,000 in bribes from the contractors. He was also accused of using his position to influence the awarding of contracts to his preferred bidders.

However, the Nigerian Army has been hampered by corruption, which has impeded their ability to successfully combat the group. According to a report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC), corruption in the Nigerian Army "has been pervasive for many years, and has become increasingly serious over the past decade" ("Corruption," 2020). This corruption has been largely attributed to "the diversion of resources and the failure to provide resources necessary to combat Boko Haram" (Corruption, 2020).

The impact of corruption within the Nigerian Army has been far-reaching. The diversion of resources has caused a decrease in the army's capacity to fight Boko Haram, as well as a decrease in the morale of soldiers (Corruption, 2020). The lack of resources and the lack of morale have caused a decrease in the effectiveness of the Nigerian Army, which has allowed Boko Haram to remain active in many areas of the country ("Corruption", 2020). Furthermore, the lack of resources has caused the Nigerian Army to be unable to adequately equip soldiers, resulting in a lack of proper equipment.

The study identified corruption as one of the major obstacles to the success of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in tackling the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East Nigeria. The military high command in Nigeria is particularly prone to corruption, leading to a lack of transparency, accountability and efficiency in the MNJTF's operations. The military high command in Nigeria is composed of the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff. These individuals are responsible for the overall strategic direction and performance of the military and are at the forefront of the battle against Boko Haram. Corruption within the

military high command has been identified as a major obstacle to the MNJTF's efforts to tackle the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East Nigeria (Kurfi, 2018). Corruption among the military high command has led to a lack of transparency and accountability in the operations of the MNJTF. The lack of transparency has led to the misallocation of resources, the manipulation of contracts and the misappropriation of funds (Kurfi, 2018).

The lack of accountability has resulted in a lack of effective oversight of the MNJTF's operations and a lack of accountability for the resources allocated to the fight against Boko Haram. In addition, corruption among the military high command has led to a lack of efficiency in the MNJTF's operations. The lack of efficiency has resulted in the deployment of inadequate resources and personnel to the fight against Boko Haram, as well as a lack of coordination between the various branches of the military. This has led to a lack of progress in the fight against Boko Haram and a lack of confidence among the population in the government's ability to successfully tackle the terrorist group (Kurfi, 2018).

Furthermore, corruption among the military high command has led to a lack of trust among the members of the MNJTF, as well as between the MNJTF and the local population. This lack of trust has resulted in the MNJTF being viewed as an occupying force and has hindered its ability to effectively tackle the Boko Haram armed terrorist group in North-East Nigeria (Kurfi, 2018).

4. Conclusion

The fight against Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin has been a challenging and complex task due to the multi-faceted nature of the conflict and the involvement of multiple countries. The establishment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2009 was a major step towards improving coordination and collaboration between the different countries involved in the fight. However, despite the efforts of the MNJTF, the Boko Haram insurgency continues to pose a threat to the region. This is due to a combination of operational weaknesses, a lack of resources and the presence of underlying conditions that are conducive to the growth of extremism and violence. In order to effectively address the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, there needs to be a comprehensive approach that considers the long-term economic, social, and political conditions in the region. This should include increased investment in infrastructure, local capacity-building, and the development of a cohesive regional security strategy.

Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made:

1. To effectively combat Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) should adhere strictly to the principles of collective security. They must collaborate with local communities and stakeholders for information gathering and sharing. Trust-building activities should be promoted to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, regional cooperation and intelligence sharing with neighboring countries should be improved. Furthermore, the MNJTF should ensure the protection of human rights and avoid actions that may inadvertently drive locals toward extremist groups. A comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to security will aid in successfully countering Boko Haram.
2. The Multi-National Joint Taskforce should be expanded to include more nations and the capacity of the taskforce should be increased in order to more effectively combat the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin. Also, a comprehensive strategy should be developed to target the root causes of the insurgency, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of access to education and resources.

3. Anti-corruption training should be provided to members of the military high command to ensure that they understand the consequences of engaging in corrupt activities and how to avoid them. To facilitate it, a strict code of conduct should be implemented and enforced to ensure that all members of the military high command adhere to ethical standards. Furthermore, the Nigerian military should make all financial transactions and decision-making processes more transparent to the public and other stakeholders to reduce and discourage corrupt activities. Also, a system of accountability should be enforced at the highest levels of the military to ensure that any form of corruption is identified and swiftly dealt with.

REFERENCES

[1] L. Adebayo, "The Impact of Corruption on the Multinational Joint Task Force in Countering the Boko Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria," Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 187–215, 2020.

[2] I. Adejoh and B. Omonona, "The Effect of Television Viewing on Academic Performance Among Secondary School Students in Nigeria," International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol. 5, no. 10, pp. 218–225, 2015.

[3] O. Adekunle and A. Bello, "An Assessment of the Effect of Financial Sector Development on Economic Growth in Nigeria," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 55–65, 2018.

[4] Transparency International, "What Is Corruption?" Transparency International, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption.

[5] C. Crocker, F. Hampson, P. Aall, and P. Luck, Eds., Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.

[6] F. G. Goyei, "Nigeria's Boko Haram and Its Security Dynamics in the West African Sub-Region," Journal of Language, Technology and Entrepreneurship in Africa, vol. 9, no. 1, 2018.

[7] I. Kant, Perpetual Peace. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.

[8] H. Kissinger, Diplomacy. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

[9] M. Kugelman and S. O'Brien, Eds., "Opportunities and Challenges in Global Health Governance," in Global Health Governance. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2015, pp. 1–24.

[10] D. Marc, J. Okeke, and S. Olojo, "Boko Haram: Impact and Lessons for Counter-Terrorism in Africa," African Security Review, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 52–68, 2015. doi: 10.1080/10246029.2015.1101077.

[11] E. Nwachukwu, "The Effectiveness of the Nigerian Military," International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 39–44, 2016.

[12] C. M. Nkem, "The Impact of Corruption on Economic Development in Nigeria," International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 49–57, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327211395_The_Impact_of_Corruption_on_Economic_Development_in_Nigeria.

[13] B. F. Obamamoye, "Counter-Terrorism, Multinational Joint Task Force, and the Missing Components," African Identities, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 428–440, 2017.

[14] W. Okumu, "The Boko Haram Insurgency: The Need for a Multi-Faceted Approach," Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 54–77, 2015.

[15] O. O. Oluwole, "Causes of Failure of the Collective Security Doctrine," International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1–12, 2017.

[16] F. C. Onuoha and S. Oyewole, "Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria," Al Jazeera Centre for Studies Reports, 2019. [Online]. Available: http://studies.aljazeera.net.

[17] A. F. K. Organski, World Politics. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.

[18] J. Siegle, "Chad's President Accuses Nigerian Forces of Slowing Advance Against Boko Haram," The Guardian, 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/30/chad-nigeria-boko-haram-idriss-deby.

[19] A. Thaon, J. Golaz, and G. Yalcinkaya, "Collective Security in the Age of Insecurity: Exploring the Effects of International Cooperation on Global Security," International Studies Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 263–281, 2019. doi: 10.1093/isp/ekz007.

[20] Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2019," 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019.

[21] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "International Terrorism: Definition of Terrorism," UNODC, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/definitions.html.

[22] Voice of America News, "Boko Haram Fighters Use Lake Chad Basin as Hideout, Recruitment Ground," 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.voanews.com/africa/boko-haram-fighters-use-lake-chad-basin-hideout-recruitment-ground.

[23] N. Weeraratne, "The Rise of Boko Haram: Understanding Terrorism in Nigeria," African Security Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 83–97, 2015.

[24] D. Woldemicheal, "Transnational Terrorism: The Causes and Responses," International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol. 1, no. 7, pp. 9–17, 2006.

[25] S. Yusuf, "The Multinational Joint Task Force: A Case Study of Regional Cooperation in Countering Conflict in West Africa," Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 71–93, 2018. doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1799.

[26] I. Zamfir, "African-Led Counterterrorism Measures Against Boko Haram," European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015. PE.551.302.